Six-Day War - Background and Summary of Events Leading To War

Background and Summary of Events Leading To War

After the 1956 Suez Crisis, Egypt agreed to the stationing of a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai to ensure all parties would comply with the 1949 Armistice Agreements. In the following years, there were numerous minor border clashes between Israel and its Arab neighbors, particularly Syria. On November 4, 1966, the Soviet Union vetoed a six-Power resolution, that invited Syria to prevent incidents that constitute a violation of the General Armistice Agreement.

Soon thereafter, in response to Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) guerilla activity, including a mine attack that killed three Israeli soldiers, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) attacked the village of as-Samu in the Jordanian-occupied West Bank. Jordanian units that engaged the Israelis were quickly beaten back. Between 14 and 21 Jordanian soldiers were killed in the operation and 37 more were wounded. Overall, 18 were killed, 130 wounded, while 125 houses, the school, and the clinic were destroyed in the attack. Israel's attack was deplored by the Security Council, which emphasized to Israel that actions of military reprisal could not be tolerated. King Hussein of Jordan criticized Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser for failing to come to Jordan's aid, and "hiding behind UNEF skirts". The Samu raid shattered the fragile trust between Israel and Jordan, leading the Jordanian leadership to believe Israel's strategic goal was to occupy the West Bank. According to one source, this alleged fear that in the event of a regional war, Israel would invade the West Bank, led to King Husayn's decision to sign a joint defense pact with Egypt. Others however have theorized that Hussein's pact with Egypt was motivated by a desire to placate domestic pressures and preserve his throne. Still others have noted that Hussein closed ranks with Nasser because he had to convince Arabs "that he was not a puppet of the West."

Between 1966 and 1967 Israel’s borders saw repeated Arab terrorist attacks and Syrian military activity. On May 11, UN Secretary General U Thant leveled criticism at Syria for its sponsorship of Palestinian terrorism, denouncing those attacks as "deplorable," "insidious" and "menaces to peace."

During 1965-7, Israel's armed forces staged numerous provocations along the Israeli-Syrian border area. This escalation led the Syrians and the Soviets to believe Israel was planning to overthrow the Syrian regime using military force. On April 7, 1967, a serious incident broke out between Israel and Syria over a cultivation problem within the demilitarized zone. Israel took military action against Syria, and eventually both sides employed artillery, tanks, and mortars. During this clash Israeli airstrikes were launched a few miles from Damascus. Israel bombed both Syrian border villages, and Syrian military targets, and had refused a cease-fire proposal by the Chairman of Mixed Armistice Commission. After several hours the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization managed to arrange a cease-fire. Following this confrontation Arab governments pledged their support to Syria, but also complained that the Jordanian air force had done nothing to help Syrian planes even when they were shot down in Jordanian airspace.

In May 1967, Israeli officials began to publicly threaten military action against Syria if Syria did not stop Palestinian guerrillas from crossing the border into Israel. Following that, Nasser received false intelligence reports from the Soviet Union that an Israeli attack on Syria was imminent. Egyptian intelligence later confirmed that the Soviet reports of Israeli force concentrations were in fact groundless, but Nasser had by then already started his buildup and he feared that since a large portion of his army was already in the Sinai, a sudden callback of those forces would result in humiliation at a time when Nasser could ill afford being humiliated. On May 19, U Thant called statements attributed to Israeli leaders "so threatening as to be particularly inflammatory in the sense that they could only heighten emotions and thereby increase tensions on the other side of the lines". Nasser then misled the Egyptian people by perpetuating the falsehood claiming in an address on the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, that the IDF was concentrating forces "on Syria's doorstep." Israel's threats to invade Syria appeared serious to Arab leaders, however, and foreign observers suspected that an Israeli strike on Syria was imminent. According to Michael Oren, Nasser disregarded the counsel of his own intelligence and began massing his troops in the Sinai Peninsula on Israel's border (May 16), expelled the UNEF force from Gaza and Sinai (May 19), and took up UNEF positions at Sharm el-Sheikh, overlooking the Straits of Tiran. According to Moshe Shemesh, as Egypt and Syria shared a mutual defence pact, Nasser responded to the Israeli threats by beginning to concentrate his troops in the Sinai Peninsula according to the "Qahir" (Conqueror) defence plan. He also decided to prepare the feda'iyyun for carrying out the "Fahd 2 (Leopard) Plan" inside Israel and to coordinate military operations with Syria.

The Straits of Tiran was regarded by the Western Powers and Israel as an international waterway but its legal status was the subject of international controversy. The Arabs believed that they had the right to regulate passage of ships while Israel, with the support of other major world powers, countered that the Arab claims were legally not supportable. In 1967 Israel reiterated declarations made in 1957 that any closure of the Straits would be considered an act of war, or a justification for war. On May 22 Nasser declared the Straits closed to Israeli shipping. Nasser stated he was open to referring the closure to the International Court of Justice to determine its legality, but this option was rejected by Israel. Egyptian propaganda attacked Israel, and on May 27, Nasser stated "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight."

On May 30, Jordan and Egypt signed a defense pact. The following day, at Jordan's invitation, the Iraqi army began deploying troops and armored units in Jordan. They were later reinforced by an Egyptian contingent. On June 1, Israel formed a National Unity Government by widening its cabinet, and on June 4 the decision was made to go to war. The next morning, Israel launched Operation Focus, a large-scale surprise air strike that was the opening of the Six-Day War.

Most scholarly accounts of the crisis attribute the drift to war to an escalation that was unwanted, however despite a desire to avoid war on all sides, everyone was in the end responsible for making the escalation unavoidable.