John Mitchel - Mitchel's Policy On Armed Resistance

Mitchel's Policy On Armed Resistance

Mitchel wrote in The Nation on 5 February 1848, "I say distinctly… that I do not recommend an immediate insurrection… Mr Doheny has shown most graphically how the people would be butchered if they rose in armed resistance to the poor rates; but the only resistance to rates I spoke of was passive resistance. Passive resistance was the word".

It was Mitchel's opinion that the great mass of the Irish people were hostile to the law and the law makers of England, and that passive resistance could bring English law into contempt. He urged the people not to pay rent or poor rates, and to resist the forcible sale of farm produce to pay rent. Mitchel's policy has since come to be known as "boycotting".
Mitchel had come to the view that "the whole system ought to be met with resistance at every point; and the means for this would be extremely simple; namely, a combination amongst the people to obstruct and render impossible the transport and shipment of Irish provisions; to refuse all aid in its removal; to destroy the highways, to prevent everyone, by intimidation, from daring to bid for grain or cattle if brought to auction under distress;" (a method of obstruction which had put an end to tithes before) "in short, to offer a passive resistance universally, but occasionally, when opportunity served, to try the steel".

Writing in the United Irishman, on 12 February, Mitchel anticipated the Government's response to his open letter to Lord Clarendon: "Yes, of course you will prosecute before long; in self-defence, I hope, you must... I intend, then, to pay special regard to the jury lists, to excite public attention continually to the jury arrangements of this city; and, above all, to publish a series of interesting lectures on "the office and duty of jurors", more especially in cases of sedition, where the "law" is at one side, and the liberty of their country at the other... this same anticipated prosecution is one of the chief weapons wherewith we mean to storm and sack the enchanted Castle. For be it known to you, that in such a case you shall either publicly, boldly, notoriously, pack a jury, or else see the accused rebel walk a free man out of the Court of Queen's Bench — which will be a victory only less than the rout of your Lordship's redcoats in the open field. And think you that in case of such a victory, I will not repeat the blow? and again repeat it,— until all the world shall see that England's law does not govern this nation?

"But you will pack ? You will have up The United Irishman before twelve of your Lordship's lion-and-unicorn tradesmen who are privileged to supply some minor matters for the vice regal establishment? Will you do this, and carry your conviction with a high hand? I think you will, nay, I think you must, if you and your nation mean to go on making even a show of governing here".

Mitchel thought the time for action had come: the mass agitation of O'Connell had failed, and as to Parliamentary action, "I am weary of constitutional agitation, and will never lift a finger to help it more. I believe we have not the materials for it, and that the show of constitutional power we possess was exactly devised by our enemies to delude us into an endless and drift agitation. We have miserable franchises, and every day makes them worse. We have a government that first makes us poor, and then tempts our poverty with bribes and promises. We have few men of public virtue and national spirit, and in a sinking and debased province we cannot hope to rear such men more abundantly."

Mitchel felt that the Government would respond only to "armed opinion": "must the force of opinion always be legal? — always be peaceful? Does opinion then mean law? Does opinion cease to be opinion the moment it steps out of the trenches of the constitution? Why, sir, I hold that there is no opinion in Ireland worth a farthing which is not illegal. I hold that armed opinion is a thousand times stronger than unarmed — and further, that in a national struggle that opinion is the most potent whose sword is sharpest, and whose aim is surest. We are told it was opinion and sympathy, and other metaphysical entities that rescued Italy, and scared Austria back from Ferrara without a blow. Yes, but it was opinion with the helmet of a national guard on his head, and a long sword by his side; it was opinion, standing, match in hand, at the breech of a gun charged to the muzzle. Now, I say all this, not to vindicate myself, for I have nowhere recommended the Irish nation to attain legislative independence by force of arms in their present broken and divided condition (as Mr O'Connell's resolution imputes to me), not to vindicate myself, but to vindicate the original free constitution of our confederacy".

Mitchel's Letter to Lord Clarendon (see below) asserted that "we differ from the illustrious conspirators of Ninety-Eight, not in principle — no, not an iota — but, as I shall presently show you, materially as to the mode of action. Theirs was a secret conspiracy — ours is a public one. They had not learned the charm of open, honest, outspoken resistance to oppression and through their secret organization you wrought their ruin — we defy you, and all the informers and detectives that British corruption ever bred. No espionage can tell you more than we will proclaim once a week on the house-tops. If you desire to have a Castle detective employed about the United Irishman office in Trinity Street I shall make no objection, provided the man be sober and honest. If Sir George Grey or Sir William Somerville would like to read our correspondence, we make him welcome for the present — only let the letters be forwarded without losing a post. So that you see we get rid of the whole crew of informers at once."

Mitchel evidently anticipated open conflict between the Irish people and the state, but wished to await the best opportunity. He believed that passive resistance to "so-called law" could not be effectively carried out without occasional outbreaks of violence, preferably street-fighting in cities rather than in the open fields since the police and soldiers had superior arms and were better trained. Opportunities for such conditions would arise, in particular, whenever the Government attempted to arrest any of the popular leaders and the Government "went through the farce of trying him with a packed jury."