Invasion of Waikato - Preparation To Suppress The Kingitanga

Preparation To Suppress The Kingitanga

The Waikato campaign differed from the previous Māori Campaign in Taranaki in that it was planned by the governor to end the threat posed by the rebel King Movement. It was estimated that to be successful at least ten thousand troops were needed. Outside of Britain and India the British Imperial Army amounted to only about forty thousand men and by pointing out the history of the warlike Maori, such as the stealing of gunpowder from his home on Kawau Island, Governor Grey persuaded the Colonial Office in London to send a quarter of them to New Zealand. General Sir Duncan Cameron was appointed to lead the campaign. Previously he had fought in the Crimean War, which had been a logistical disaster for the British Army, and had developed very strong ideas on what was needed to support an army in the field. This was to influence his prudent conduct in the campaign. The Governor had for years received messages of support from NgaPuhi in the campaigns against rebel Waikato Maori. They offered to supply thousands of warriors to support the government in defeating the Waikato rebels,their enemy from the musket war era. Prominent Pakeha Maori such as Judge F Manning, who had considerable war experience and spoke fluent Maori, offered to act as their leader in liasing with the government. The government turned down the offer, not wanting to continue the blood letting of the muskets wars. However individual Nga Puhi did join the government forces.

Access to the Waikato region was the first problem. The road south of Auckland extended only about sixty kilometers, well short of the frontier enforced by the rebels and had to be extended at least as far as the Waikato River. Additional food and ammunition reserves were needed for the extra troops arriving from Australia, and Cameron and Grey were determined not to move until they were ready.30,000 pounds was spent by the New Zealand government designing and having shallow draft gunboats built in Sydney. A fleet including HMS Eclipse, Esk, Fawn, Himalaya, Miranda, Orpheus, Wasp, gunboats; Koheroa,Paparata,Rangiriri and various support vessels; Kate, Light of the Age, Prince Albert, Reliance, Sandfly, Sir Harry Smith, Spitfire, Star of India, Stuart, Wakool and Tarawera supported the war effort either on the Waikato River, landing troops and supplies at Miranda in the Firth Of Thames, or bringing troops and a regular stream of supplies from Australia.

After receiving a series of 18 threatening letters from Tamihana, the Waikato leader who was until then was considered one of the more peaceful rangatira and who had negotiated the truce at the end of the First Taranki War, on 9 July 1863 Governor Grey expelled virtually all the Māori living in the territory controlled by the British south of Auckland after Kingitanga Maori refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the Queen. Grey, who spoke fluent Maori and was very familiar with the culture, knew that Tamihana was following normal Maori war ritual in giving him advance warning that an attack was about to be made on Auckland. Grey responded in kind by giving rebels a chance to reconsider their war-like stance. Rebels were asked to hand in all firearms, but only a few rusty muskets were surrendered. Three days later the vanguard of the army crossed the frontier into Kingite territory and established a forward camp. Cameron sent out a scouting a party of unarmed soldiers in civilian clothes to reconnoitre the rebel positions. Forest Rangers based at Papakura set out from the Queens Redoubt to investigate earthwork spotted about the Koheroa ridge, 10 miles to the east, in open country, but close to the Hunua Ranges. Two forest rangers scouted the position at night and found a huge well prepared military complex consisting of isolated rifle pits hidden by scattered scrub with whare with bullet proof mat roofs to accommodate 1000 warriors. Above this was a pa with further rifle pits on a stockaded ridge. Large areas of wheat, potatoes and maize had been planted to support the warriors. On 17 July they advanced to the banks of the Waikato River and 500 soldiers advanced up a ridge and defeated a force of 400 Māori led by Te Huirama of Ngati Mahutawho at Koheroa. The Kingitanga forces then fled back to the Whangamarino swamp and returned to their advanced camp and stayed there until 31 October. Thirty Maori were killed including Te Huirama. One soldier died and 11 were wounded. General Cameron was very conscious of the fact that he was operating at the end of a long and vulnerable supply line, which Māori forces demonstrated by attacking numerous points along the route. Cameron established an alternative supply route using the lower Waikato River. A supply depot was built at Camerontown near an old pa. It was defended by 4 Europeans and 20 Ngati Whauroa. A hundred Ngāti Maniapoto launched a surprise attack on 7 Sept and killed 5 including all the British while they were in a canoe. The Ngati Whauroa defenders left immediately. Three weeks later this small group went over to the Kingities with their chief Hona. It has been suggested that the Ngati Whauroa were playing a double game and had given information to Ngati Maniapoto prior to the attack. Forty tonnes of horse fodder, bran and corn, were burnt, but this had little effect on the campaign. A rescue party of 50 soldiers were ambushed as they approached the scene. Both officers were shot, one fatally, and the NCOs retrieved the wounded and put up a valiant defence in the bush against an enemy that outnumbered them 2 to 1. Two VCs were later awarded and 5 DCMs; see Camerontown.

On Sept 12 a taua (war party) of 200 toa (warriors) left Meremere led by a tohunga Hopa te Rangianini and high chief Wahaanui, in several waka (canoes). The taua consistered of mainly Ngati Maniapoto with some Ngati Pou and a few North Waikato men. They travelled down the Waikato River, crossed over the Mangatawhiri stream boundary and attacked the Alexandra redoubt at Tuakau, 3 km north of the Waikato Kingitanga boundary. After the attack failed, they hid in the dense bush in the hills north of Pokeno, only venturing out to murder unarmed settlers at Ramarama. Maori forces killed 15 settlers at Ramarama, Pukekohe, TeIaroa, Papakura, Te Wairoa and Mangemangeroa, although other sources say 22 people were killed.

Settlers at Pukekohe east had learned of the Maori attacks and started to fortify their church with a 1.3m high stockade made from thick horizontal logs surrounded by a 900mm, 1.8m wide trench. The defences were only partly completed when the taua was spotted 90m away. Sergeant Perry and twenty settlers retreated to the church to prepare for battle. It ended in a severe defeat for the Maori invaders, of whom 40 were killed and two were taken prisoner, with no settler casualties. A grim reality of the war was that the two Maori captured were known to the settlers as sellers of peaches and pigs.

Meanwhile, the army was building a string of at least twenty redoubts and strong points along the supply route, and manning these mini-fortresses and protecting the supply lines absorbed all but 2,000 of Cameron's troops. The other result from this delay was a very serious breakdown in the relationship between the Colonial Government that demanded a quick victory, and the British Imperial Troops fighting on their behalf. Relations between Governor Grey and General Cameron soured because Grey felt that any delay was unnecessary, while Cameron resented any political interference in military matters, as well as the use of British troops to acquire Māori land for the Colonial Government to sell. Cameron particularly felt that Grey's expulsion of the Māori from the occupied territory south of Auckland was both unnecessarily vindictive and had contributed numerous angry recruits to the enemy.