First Taranaki War - The Battle of Puketakauere

The Battle of Puketakauere

On 20 April 1860 Browne ordered a suspension of hostilities against Taranaki Māori, fearing the intervention of the King Movement and a possible attack on Auckland. He knew he lacked the resources to defend Auckland if troops were engaged in Taranaki. Both Kingi and the Government made repeated diplomatic approaches to King Pōtatau Te Wherowhero seeking his allegiance, but by early May Pōtatau seemed to have decided to offer at least token support to Taranaki Māori, sending a Kingite war party to the district under the control of war chief Epiha Tokohihi. Kingi seized the opportunity to spark a confrontation with the imperial government to demonstrate the viability of resistance and draw stronger Kingite support.

Early in June, Atiawa war chief Hapurona began building a stockaded pā, Onukukaitara, adjacent to an ancient, and apparently unpopulated and unfortified, pā known as Puketakauere. The two pā were sited on a pair of low hills 800m southeast of Te Kohia and 1.6 km south of the garrison known as Camp Waitara (site of the modern town of Waitara), which had been established to protect the surveying of Waitara. The pā posed a military threat to the Waitara garrison and was seen as extreme provocation.

On 23 June, a British reconnaissance party approached the pā, in what may have been an attempt to bait the Māori, and was fired on. Colonel Gold immediately authorised an attack. Before dawn on 27 June, the British commander at Waitara, Major Thomas Nelson, marched out with 350 experienced troops and two 24-pound howitzers to storm the pā, which was defended by about 200 Atiawa.

The troops intended to encircle the two hills, cutting off a path of retreat for the Māori, before destroying Onukukaitara, above the flax-covered stockade of which flew a flag. The troops split into three divisions for the march. Nelson led the main body of almost 180 men and the two howitzers on an approach from the north, intending to bombard the stockade from the south-west. A second division of 125 men, led by Captain William Messenger, was given the more difficult task of approaching the area in darkness through a swampy gully and high fern and scrub to the east, taking possession of the apparently deserted Puketakauere, blocking the path of any possible reinforcements and supporting Nelson's efforts against the main target. His approach was made more challenging by the heavy mid-winter rain that had deepened the swamp. The remaining division, about 60 men under Captain Bowdler, was to take up a position on a mound between the pā and Camp Waitara, blocking an escape to the north.

About 7am, Nelson's howitzers began pounding their target, but created only a small breach in the fort. His men then approached the pā across open ground, but came under heavy fire from Māori concealed just metres away in deep trenches in a small natural gully. The attack was described by some survivors as "hotter than anything in the great Indian battles or in the attack on the Redan in the Crimea".

As they came under fire, Messenger's division found itself the target of other Māori who ambushed them from outlying trenches on the fern-covered slopes. Messenger's division became disordered and was split into groups. Many troops were tomahawked in the swamp or drowned as they fled to the flooded Waitara River. Most of the wounded were abandoned and many of those were hacked to death. A group of survivors with Messenger managed to join Nelson, who sounded the retreat, while others remained hiding in the swamp and fern and returned to camp later.

Puketakauere was both the most important and most disastrous battle of the First Taranaki War for the British, who suffered losses of 32 killed and 34 wounded, almost one in five of the force engaged. It was also one of the three most clear-cut defeats suffered by imperial troops in New Zealand. Despite claims at the time that the British killed between 130 and 150 of the enemy, Māori casualties were estimated to be just five, including two Maniapoto chiefs.

Colonel Gold came under heavy criticism for the defeat. He was accused of cowardice and stupidity and an attempt was made to persuade the senior militia officer to arrest him. He was subsequently replaced by Major-General Thomas Pratt.

The real reason for the Māori victory, however, was a combination of tactics and engineering techniques. Hapurona had enticed the British to fight at a place of his own choosing and then used the twin ploys of deception and concealment. He created a false target for the British artillery with the fortification of Onukukaitara which, despite its flag and flax-covered stockade, was essentially an empty pā. Māori defences were instead concentrated on the old, apparently unfortified pā, where deep trenches concealed the well-armed warriors until the British were almost at point-blank range. When the British were split into two groups at the two hills, Hapurona was also able to switch warriors from each focus of action, forcing the British to fight two battles while the Māori fought just one.

In the wake of the demoralising loss, the central portion of New Plymouth was entrenched and most women and children were evacuated to Nelson, out of fear the town would be attacked. The garrison was reinforced with almost 250 soldiers from the 40th Regiment, sent from Auckland, as well as additional artillery.