Dawda Jawara - Personal Rule and Public Support

Personal Rule and Public Support

Given Jawara’s prolonged political survival under difficult circumstances, one might expect the Gambian leader to have possessed exceptional political qualities. Jawara did possess three advantages; the same advantages which had prompted his selection as party leader in 1959. First was his protectorate birth and Mandinka ethnic identity; Jawara personified the PPP’s early electoral appeal to protectorate, and specifically Mandinka, sensibilities. His personal connections in the rural areas cultivated during his travels as a senior veterinary officer during the second half of the 1950s were seen as an additional electoral asset. Eclipsing both these attributes, however, was Jawara’s graduate status. Whereas most PPP members shared the same ethnic background, few could claim to have been educated beyond high school. Jawara’s university education both distinguished him from his colleagues and outweighed the fact that it was others who had initiated political activities within the protectorate.

In contrast to these advantages, however, Jawara possessed the decided disadvantage of low caste. As a member of the leather workers’ caste, Jawara’s social standing was much lower than many of his colleagues, which provoked doubt as to his suitability for the position of leader. Some regarded caste as a more important consideration than education and lobbied for the selection of the chief’s son, instead.

It is assumed that long-surviving political leaders do think in strategic terms, that they have some sort of “game plan” for pre-empting and countering threats to their position. That is not to downplay the importance of less tangible factors, intuition for example, but simply to say that on some level, successful leaders consider how they might prolong their rule, and respond accordingly. Secondly, it is assumed that leaders possess sufficient authority to implement their chosen strategies and that degree of skill they bring to bear on a situation will influence the outcome. Accounting for the importance of leadership, scholars typically point to the absence of established constitutional rules, effective political institutions or widely shared values, all of which, to varying degrees, characterized African states. The impact of these characteristics has been analyzed in a study by Jackson and Rosberg. Adopting the classical concept of a political institution as “an impersonal system of rules and offices that effectively binds the conduct of individuals involved in them,” they suggest that, in most African states, non-institutionalized governments “where persons take precedence over rules” prevails. Conceptualizing African politics in this way caused Jackson and Rosberg to identify a distinctive type of political system which they labeled “personal rule.” Subject to certain modifications, the theory of personal rule provides a useful framework for the study of leadership and survival, not only explaining why leaders frequently play such a key role in the elite political sphere but also identifying the specific threats that they might expect to confront.

Without the backing of effective institutional rules, a personal ruler is undoubtedly vulnerable. Nevertheless, if elites generally are unrestrained by rules, the same is equally true of leaders. Constrained only by the power of other “big men,” the political liberation supplied by a system of personal rule enables a leader to utilize strategies (designed to strengthen his grip) that would be unthinkable in institutional systems. Moreover, the political rules may be changed, as in the establishment of a single-party state to suit a leader’s personal political convenience. He may also utilize constituent components of the system of personal rule, including clientelism, patronage and purges, to perpetuate his rule. Adopting these strategies, a leader attempts to prevent politics from deteriorating into a violent fight, a fight he may well lose. Whether or not he succeeds is primarily dependent upon political skill. Jackson and Rosberg’s theory addresses threats to a regime’s survival, possible strategies to deal with threats, as well as the defining factor, or skill, which determines a leader’s success or failure. Somewhat surprisingly, this theory does not truly describe the state of Jawara’s leadership in The Gambia. Whereas systems of personal rule generally lack effective institutions and are “inherently authoritarian,” in The Gambia, Jawara’s adherence to democratic norms was responsible for both a non-authoritarian approach to power retention and a degree of institutionalization.

Although the theory of personal rule cannot be applied wholesale to the study of Gambian politics, and is subject to certain modifications, it remains a useful model. The first general point, for example, is Jackson and Rosberg’s depiction of African politics as an “institutionless” arena. Although this perspective illuminates central features of the African political process, it is important not to lose sight of the variations between states. States other than The Gambia have, at different times, exhibited varying degrees of institutionalization, some have undoubtedly enjoyed a “purer” form of personal rule than others, and in this sense it is possible to envisage an abstract scale of personal rule. The Gambia, though occupying a low ranking, would not, during the years of PPP rule, have been off the scale altogether. President Jawara was, in many ways, a typical personal ruler due to the pivotal political role he occupied, the threats he faced and the strategies he used attest to this.

One strategy or approach Jawara failed to adopt was authoritarianism. Jackson and Rosberg, noting the “widespread removal of constitutional rights and protection from political opponents, the elimination of institutional checks and balances, the termination of open party politics and the regulation and confinement of political participation, usually within the framework of a “single party,” describe systems of personal rule as “inherently authoritarian.” Jawara, on the other hand, retained a multi-party system (at least in theory), a choice which can be likely explained in one of two ways. First, it may have reflected Jawara’s perception of the political advantages of a multi-party system. If so, the theory of personal rule retains its utility. Thus, Jackson and Rosberg argue that personal rulers only follow rules when they “have been changed . . . to suit his . . . personal political convenience”. In Jawara’s case the rules were already “convenient”—there was no need to change them.

Conversely; it is possible to speculate that had the rules become a hindrance (had an opposition party won a general election, for example), Jawara’s commitment to a multi-party system was such that he would have agreed to step down. Though hardly the action of a typical leader practicing personal rule, this would nevertheless have been a personal decision. Nevertheless, although Jawara may have adhered to the rules which as a result of his personal skill as a leader had been retained, there was little to prevent him following the same route as other African leaders and instituting a series of authoritarian reforms. Indeed, many of his subordinates would have welcomed such a move. The element of restraint Jawara demonstrated with regard to political opposition was not dictated by fully established institutional rules. Rather, he chose a non-authoritarian approach. Jawara’s choice held important implications for the PPP’s survival. Perhaps most significantly, it compelled the cultivation of popular support, a feature not incorporated into Jackson and Rosberg’s theory of personal rule, which suggests that mass support is of negligible importance to a personal ruler’s survival. Though popular support may not be a necessary component of survival, it may be a significant factor in the longevity of both single-party and multi-party regimes.

The public support enjoyed by the PPP stemmed, in part, from Jawara’s personal popularity. A fundamentally pragmatic and flexible individual, Jawara was no ideologue and did not possess a charismatic hold on the populace. However, he did possess the ability to inspire trust. An important aspect of this was Jawara’s accessibility (assisted by the small size of The Gambia). He undertook annual “meet the farmers” tours,during which he listened to people’s problems and explained government policy as well as periodic meetings with sections of the Banjul Community. Despite the increased security surrounding the State House after the 1981 coup attempt, Jawara remained available to individuals or delegations seeking audience. In addition to being fairly accessible, Jawara remained “in touch” with his people. His lifestyle, though obviously comfortable, did not feature the insensitive extravagance of some African leaders. Whether distributing gifts or inspecting projects, he demonstrated a seemingly genuine concern for his people. As time passed Jawara’s longevity and seeming invincibility also worked to his advantage. Many Gambians simply could not imagine life without him.