Yongzheng Emperor - Disputed Succession

Disputed Succession

In 1712, the Kangxi Emperor removed his second son, Yinreng, as successor to the throne and did not designate an heir in his place. This led to a competition amongst sons of the Emperor for the position of crown prince. The most promising candidates were Yinzhi, Yinzhen, Yinsi, and Yinti (the third, fourth, eighth and fourteenth Imperial Princes respectively). Of the princes, Yinsi had the most support from the mandarins, but was disfavoured by Kangxi himself. Yinzhen had supported Yinreng prior to the latter's demise, and did not build a large political base until the final years of Kangxi's reign. When the Emperor died in December 1722, the field of contenders was reduced to three princes after Yinsi pledged his support to the 14th prince, Yinti.

At the time of the Kangxi Emperor's death, Yinti, as border-pacification general-in-chief (Chinese: 撫遠大將軍), was at war in the northwest in what is present-day Xinjiang. Some historians believe that this implied Kangxi's favouring Yinti for succession, and was training the next emperor in military affairs; others maintain that Kangxi intended to keep Yinti a large distance away from the capital to ensure a peaceful succession for Yinzhen. It was Yinzhen who nominated Yinti for the post — not Yinsi, with whom Yinti was closely affiliated.

The official record, which may have been modified by Yongzheng for political purposes, states that on 20 December 1722 the ailing Kangxi Emperor called seven of his sons and the general commandant of the Peking gendarmerie, Longkodo, to his bedside; Longkodo read the will, and declared that Yinzhen succeed the emperor on the throne. Some evidence has suggested that Yinzhen contacted Longkodo months before the will was read in preparation for his succession by military means, although in their official capacities frequent encounters were expected. Legend has it that Yongzheng changed Kangxi's will by adding strokes and modifying characters. The best-known account says that Yongzheng changed "fourteen" (Chinese: 十四 → shísì) to "four" (Chinese: 于四 → yúsì); others say it was "fourteen" to "fourth" (Chinese: 第四 → dìsì). While widely accepted, there is little supporting evidence—especially considering that the character 于 was not widely used during the Qing Dynasty; on official documents, 於 (yú) is used. Secondly, Qing tradition insists that the will was done in both Manchu and Chinese; Manchu writing, however, is more intricate and (in this case) impossible to modify. Furthermore, princes in the Qing Dynasty are referred to as "the Emperor's son", in the order which they were born (for example, "the emperor's fourth son": Chinese: 皇四子). Therefore, there is doubt that Yinzhen changed the will to ascend to the throne.

Yinzhen chose an era name similar in sound to his given name; 1723 was to be the first year of the Yongzheng era. For his first official act as emperor Yongzheng released his long-time ally—the 13th prince Yinxiang, who had been imprisoned by the Kangxi Emperor at the same time as the crown prince. Some sources indicate that Yinxiang, the most militant of the princes, then assembled a group of special Peking soldiers from the Fengtai command to seize immediate control of the Forbidden City and surrounding areas to prevent usurpation by Yinsi's cronies. Yongzheng's personal account stated that he was emotionally unstable and deeply saddened over his father's death, and knew it would be a burden "much too heavy" for himself if he were to succeed the throne. In addition, after the will was read Yinzhen wrote that the officials (premier Zhang Tingyu, Longkedo and Yinzhi) and Prince Cheng led the other princes in the ceremonial Three-Kneels and Nine-Salutes to the emperor. The following day Yongzheng issued an edict summoning Yinti back from Qinghai, bestowing on their mother the title "Holy Mother Empress Dowager" the day Yinti arrived at the funeral.

In the first major comprehensive biography of the Yongzheng Emperor by Feng Erkang, the author puts the Yongzheng succession in perspective. Feng writes that there were some suspicious signs from the lost wills and the dates released, but the majority of evidence points to Yinzhen succeeding the throne legitimately (although with political and military maneuvering deemed necessary by the situation). The eighth prince (Yinsi) had been bribing officials for support throughout his life, and his influence penetrated the Fengtai command. Furthermore, Feng suggests that "although we are not yet altogether certain on what happened with the succession, and which side is correct, it is reasonable to think that Yongzheng's political enemies manipulated all suspicion behind the will in an attempt to put a dark image on Yongzheng; Imperial Chinese tradition had led certain schools of thought in believing that Yongzheng's whole reign can be discredited simply because his succession of the throne did not come as a will of his father, the emperor and ultimate decision maker in China." He further suggests that Kangxi made a grave mistake by allowing his sons to become major political players (especially since the position of crown prince was empty) and a bloody battle of succession (including a possible usurpation) was the inevitable result of imperial Chinese institutions. Therefore, it would be an even-bigger mistake to judge a ruler solely on the way he came to power. Certainly, the Yongzheng Emperor ensured his successor would have a smooth transition when his turn came.