William Rufus Shafter - Spanish-American War

Spanish-American War

Just before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, Shafter was commander of the Department of California. Shafter was an unlikely candidate for command of the expedition to Cuba. He was aged 63, weighed over 300 pounds and suffered from gout. Nevertheless he received a promotion to Major General of Volunteers and command of the V Corps being assembled in Tampa, Florida. One possible reason for his being given this command was his lack of political ambitions.

Shafter appeared to maintain a very loose control over the expedition to Cuba from the beginning, commencing with a very disorganized landing by V Corps at Daiquiri on the southern coast of Cuba. Confusion prevailed over landing priorities and the chain of command. When General Sumner refused to allow the Army's Gatling Gun Detachment - which had priority - to disembark from the transport Cherokee on the grounds that the lieutenant commanding the Detachment did not have the rank to enforce his priority, Shafter had to personally intervene, returning to the ship in a steam launch to enforce his demand that the guns come off immediately.

During the disembarkation, Shafter sent forward his cavalry division under Joseph Wheeler to reconnoiter the road to Santiago de Cuba. In a complete disregard of orders, Wheeler brought on a fight which escalated into the Battle of Las Guasimas. Shafter apparently did not realize the battle was even underway nor did he say anything to Wheeler about it afterward.

A plan was finally developed for the attack on Santiago. Shafter would send his first division of infantry to attack El Caney while his second infantry division and cavalry would attack the heights south of El Caney known as San Juan Hill. Originally, Shafter planned to lead his forces from the front, but he suffered greatly from the tropical heat and was confined to his headquarters far to the rear and out of sight of the fighting. Unable to see the battle firsthand, he never developed a coherent chain of command. Shafter's offensive battle plans were both simplistic and extremely vague. He seemed to be unaware or unconcerned about the mass killing effect of modern military weapons technology possessed by the Spanish. Further, his intelligence-gathering efforts on Spanish troop dispositions and equipment was extremely meagre, though he had a number of sources available to him, including reconnaissance reports by Cuban rebel forces as well as espionage obtained from indigenous Cubans.

During the hurried attack on El Caney and San Juan Heights, American forces, who had packed the available roads and were unable maneuvre, suffered heavy losses from Spanish troops equipped with modern repeating smokeless powder rifles and breech-loading artillery, while the short-ranged blackpowder guns of U.S. artillery units were unable to respond effectively. Additional casualties were incurred in the actual assault, which was marked by a series of brave but disorganized and uncoordinated advances. After suffering some 1,400 casualties, and aided by a single Gatling Gun detachment for fire support, American troops successfully stormed and occupied both El Caney and San Juan Heights.

The next task for Shafter was the investment and siege of the city of Santiago and its garrison. However, the extent of the American losses were becoming known at Shafter's headquarters back at Sevilla (his gout, poor physical conditiong, and huge bulk did not allow him to go to the front). The casualties were delivered not only by messenger report, but also by "meat wagons" delivering the wounded and dying to the hospital. Viewing the carnage, Shafter began to waver in his determination to defeat the Spanish at Santiago. He knew his troops' position was tenuous, but again had little intelligence on the hardships of the Spanish inside beleaguered Santiago. Shafter felt the Navy was doing little to relieve the pressure on his forces. Supplies could not be delivered to the front, leaving his the men in want of necessities, particularly food rations. Shafter himself was ill, and very weak. With this view of events, Shafter sent a dramatic message to Washington. He suggested that the army should give up its attack and all its gains for the day, and withdraw to safer ground about five miles away. Fortunately, by the time this message reached Washington, Shafter changed his mind, and instead renewed siege operations after demanding the Spanish surrender the city and garrison of Santiago. With the victory of the U.S. Navy at the Battle of Santiago de Cuba, the fate of the Spanish position at Santiago was sealed. Shortly afterward, the Spanish commander surrendered the city.

With disease rampant in the American army in Cuba, Shafter and many of his officers favored a quick withdrawal from Cuba. Shafter personally left Cuba in September 1898 and arrived at the quarantine Camp Wikoff. Shafter returned to command the Department of California where he oversaw the supplying of the expedition to the Philippines under Major General Wesley Merritt.

Shafter retired in 1901 and returned to farming. He died in 1906 and is buried at San Francisco National Cemetery.