Wilhelm Canaris - Munich Agreement

Munich Agreement

He also became involved in two abortive plots to depose Hitler, first in 1938 and again in 1939. During the 1938 crisis over Czechoslovakia that culminated in the Munich Agreement, Canaris was together with the army chief of staff, General Ludwig Beck and the Foreign Office’s state secretary Ernst von Weizsäcker, a leader of the "anti-war" group in the German government, which was determined to avoid a war in 1938 that it felt Germany would lose.

This group was not necessarily committed to the overthrow of the regime, but was loosely allied to another, more radical group, the "anti-Nazi" faction centered around Colonel Hans Oster and Hans Bernd Gisevius, which wanted to use the crisis as an excuse for executing a putsch to overthrow the Nazi regime.

His most audacious attempt was in planning, with Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, to capture and eliminate Hitler and the entire Nazi party before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At this particular moment, von Kleist visited Britain secretly and discussed the situation with British MI6 and some high-ranking politicians. There, the name of Canaris became widely known as the executive hand of von Kleist in the event of an anti-Nazi plot. The high-ranking German military leaders believed that if Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia, or any other country, then Britain would declare war on Germany. MI6 was of the same opinion. The British declaration of war would have given the General Staff, in their belief, both the pretext and support for an overthrow of Hitler.

The British reaction, however, to Hitler's demands on the Sudetenland was more cautious. At a meeting with Hitler in Munich, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, (1869 – November 1940), and French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier chose diplomacy over war. Munich was a severe disappointment for Kleist and Canaris. It gave Hitler's international reputation an important boost for two reasons: one, he was able to play the part of a man of reason and compromise; and two, he could boast that his predictions that Great Britain and France would not respond with war had proven to be correct. There are claims that Canaris, who was extremely shocked by this 'dishonest and stupid decision' (his own words), decided to be cautious and wait for a better time to act against Hitler.

In January 1939, Canaris manufactured the "Dutch War Scare", which gripped the British government. By 23 January 1939 the British government received information to the effect that Germany intended to invade the Netherlands in February 1939 with the aim of using Dutch air-fields to launch strategic bombing offensive intended to achieve a "knock-out" blow against Britain by razing British cities to the ground. All this information was false, and it was intended by Canaris to achieve a change in British foreign policy. In this, Canaris was successful, and the "Dutch War Scare" played a major role in causing Chamberlain to make the "continental commitment" (i.e. sending a large British ground force to the defence of France) in February 1939.

Nevertheless, it appears likely that MI6 maintained contact with Canaris even after the Munich Agreement signed on 30 September 1938. When Winston Churchill came to power after the resignation of Chamberlain in May 1940, Canaris' hopes were renewed, given the new Prime Minister's strong position against Hitler.