Washington Naval Treaty - Japanese Denunciation

Japanese Denunciation

The naval treaty had a profound effect on the Japanese. With superior American and even British industrial power, a long war would very likely end in a Japanese defeat. Thus, gaining parity on the strategic level was not economically possible.

Many Japanese saw the 5:5:3 ratio of ships as another way of being snubbed by the West (though it can be argued that the Japanese, having a one-ocean navy, had a far greater concentration of force than the two-ocean United States Navy or the three-ocean Royal Navy). It also contributed to a schism in high ranks of the Imperial Japanese Navy between the Treaty Faction officers on the one hand and on the other those opposed to it, who were also allied to the ultranationalists in the Japanese army and other parts of the Japanese government. For Treaty Faction opponents, the Treaty was one of the factors which contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between the United States and the Japanese Empire. The perception of unfairness led to Japan's renunciation of the Naval Limitation Treaties in 1936. Isoroku Yamamoto, who later masterminded the Pearl Harbor attack, held that Japan should remain in the treaty and was therefore regarded by many as a member of the Treaty Faction. His view was more complex, however, in that he felt the United States could out-produce Japan by a greater factor than the 5:3 ratio because of the huge US production advantage, on which he was an expert, having served in the Japanese Embassy in Washington. He felt that other methods would be needed to even the odds, which may have contributed to his advocacy of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor. However, he did not have sufficient influence at Navy headquarters or in the government.

On 29 December 1934, the Japanese government gave formal notice that it intended to terminate the treaty. Its provisions remained in force until the end of 1936, and it was not renewed, Japan effectively leaving the treaty in 1936.