Vicente Rojo Lluch - Spanish Civil War

Spanish Civil War

When the Civil War started (July 1936), Rojo - a devout Catholic, and linked to the conservative Unión Militar Española - stayed loyal to the Republican Government and was one of the military professionals who participated in the reorganization of the Spanish Republican Army.

In October 1936 he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and was designated head of the General Staff of the Forces of Defense commanded by General Jose Miaja, head of the Junta de Defensa de Madrid created to defend the capital at all costs after the transfer of the Republican government from Madrid to Valencia. In this capacity he prepared an effective defense plan for the city that prevented its fall. Afterwards, his fame as an organizer increased. As head of the Central Army HQ, he demonstrated outstanding performance in the planning of the main operations developed by the mentioned Army, in the battles of Jarama, Guadalajara, Brunete and Belchite.

On March 24, 1937 he was promoted to colonel, and after the formation of the Negrín government in May, was made Head of the General Command Staff of the Armed Forces and head of the General Staff of the Ground forces. From this new position he was in charge of directing the expansion of the People's Army, and created the denominated Mobile Army, that served as the offensive advance force of the Republican Army.

On September 22, 1937 he was promoted to the rank of general. Throughout that year he planned the offensives of Huesca, Brunete, Belchite, Zaragoza and Teruel. He was awarded the highest Republican decoration, the "Placa Laureada de Madrid" on January 11, 1938 for his planning of the last mentioned operation.

The most ambitious operation he carried out throughout 1938 was the offensive of the Ebro, a plan that grew from the previously mentioned tactical assumption developed in the Superior War School, that gave rise to the long running battles of the Ebro that developed from July 25 to November 16, 1938. In these battles the Republic gambled its international prestige, its endurance and the possibility of being able to give a favorable turn to the course of the war. In December 1938 he planned an offensive in Andalusia and Extremadura in order to halt the Nationalist offensive against Catalonia, but the generals Matallana and Miaja rejected the plan and the offensive didn't start until January 1939 and failed.