Vela Incident - Subsequent Developments

Subsequent Developments

Since 1980, some small amounts of new information have emerged. However, most questions remain unanswered:

• A Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory report from 1981 notes: TIROS-N plasma data and related geophysical data measured on 22 September 1979 were analyzed to determine whether the electron precipitation event detected by TIROS-N at 00:54:49 universal time could have been related to a surface nuclear burst (SNB). The occurrence of such a burst was inferred from light signals detected by two Vela bhangmeters −2 min before the TIROS-N event. We found the precipitation to be unusually large but not unique. It probably resulted from passage of TIROS-N through the precipitating electrons above a pre-existing auroral arc that may have brightened to an unusually high intensity from natural causes −3 min before the Vela signals....We conclude that such an event, although rare, is not unique and, furthermore, that this particular event was associated with an auroral arc that probably existed before the Vela event. Although it may be argued that the segment of the arc sampled by the TIROS-N was intensified by a SNB, we find no evidence to support this thesis or to suggest that the observation was anything but the result of natural magnetospheric processes.

• In October 1984, a National Intelligence Estimate on the South African nuclear program noted: There is still considerable disagreement within the Intelligence Community as to whether the flash in the South Atlantic detected by a US satellite in September 1979 was a nuclear test, and if so, by South Africa. If the latter, the need for South Africa to test a device during the time frame of this Estimate is significantly diminished. A shorter form of this wording was used in a subsequent National Intelligence Council memorandum of September, 1985.

• In February 1994, Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, a convicted Soviet spy and the commander of South Africa's Simon's Town naval base at the time, talked about the incident upon his release from prison. He said: Although I was not directly involved in planning or carrying out the operation, I learned unofficially that the flash was produced by an Israeli-South African test, code-named Operation Phoenix. The explosion was clean and was not supposed to be detected. But they were not as smart as they thought, and the weather changed — so the Americans were able to pick it up. Gerhardt further stated that no South African naval vessels had been involved, and that he had no first-hand knowledge of a nuclear test.

• On April 20, 1997, the Israeli daily newspaper Haaretz quoted the South African deputy foreign minister, Aziz Pahad, as supposedly confirming that the "double flash" from over the Indian Ocean was indeed from a South African nuclear test. Haaretz also cited past reports that Israel had purchased 550 tons of uranium from South Africa for its own nuclear plant in Dimona. In exchange, Israel allegedly supplied South Africa with nuclear weapons design information and nuclear materials to increase the power of nuclear warheads. Pahad's statement was confirmed by the United States embassy in Pretoria, South Africa, but Pahad's press secretary stated that Pahad had said only that "there was a strong rumor that a test had taken place, and that it should be investigated". In other words, he was merely repeating rumors that had been circulating for years. David Albright, commenting on the stir created by this press report, stated: The U.S. government should declassify additional information about the event. A thorough public airing of the existing information could resolve the controversy.

• In October 1999, a white paper that was published by the U.S. Senate Republican Policy Committee in opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty stated: There remains uncertainty about whether the South Atlantic flash in September 1979 recorded by optical sensors on the U.S. Vela satellite was a nuclear detonation and, if so, to whom it belonged.

• In his 2006 book On the Brink, the retired C.I.A. clandestine service officer Tyler Drumheller wrote of his 1983–88 tour-of-duty in South Africa: We had operational successes, most importantly regarding Pretoria's nuclear capability. My sources collectively provided incontrovertible evidence that the apartheid government had in fact tested a nuclear bomb in the South Atlantic in 1979, and that they had developed a delivery system with assistance from the Israelis.

• Some American information related to this incident has been declassified in the form of heavily redacted reports and memoranda following applications made under the USA Freedom of Information Act; on May 5, 2006, many of these declassified documents were made available through the USA National Security Archive.