United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 - Context

Context

The resolution is the formula proposed by the Security Council for the successful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular, ending the state of belligerency then existing between the 'States concerned', Israel and Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The resolution deals with five principles; withdrawal of Israeli forces, 'peace within secure and recognized boundaries', freedom of navigation, a just settlement of the refugee problem and security measures including demilitarized zones. It also provided for the appointment of a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East in order to promote agreement on a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the principles outlined in the resolution.

Upon presenting the draft resolution to the Security Council, the U.K. representative Lord Caradon said:

All of us recognize that peace is the prize. None of us wishes a temporary truce or a superficial accommodation. We could never advocate a return to uneasy hostility. As I have said, my Government would never wish to be associated with any so-called settlement which was only a continuation of a false truce, and all of us without any hesitation at all can agree that we seek a settlement within the principles laid down in Article 2 of the Charter. So much for the preamble.

As to the first operative paragraph, and with due respect for fulfillment of Charter principles, we consider it essential that there should be applied the principles of both withdrawal and security, and we have no doubt that the words set out throughout that paragraph are perfectly clear.

As to the second operative paragraph, there is I believe no vestige of disagreement between us all that there must be a guarantee of freedom of navigation through international waterways. There must be a just settlement of the refugee problem. There must be a guarantee and adequate means to ensure the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area.

As to the third operative paragraph, I have said before that I consider that the United Nations special representative should be free to decide himself the exact means and methods by which he pursues his endeavors in contact with the States concerned both to promote agreement and to assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted and final settlement."

Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented on the most significant area of disagreement regarding the resolution:

There was much bickering over whether that resolution should say from "the" territories or from "all" territories. In the French version, which is equally authentic, it says withdrawal de territory, with de meaning "the." We wanted that to be left a little vague and subject to future negotiation because we thought the Israeli border along the West Bank could be "rationalized"; certain anomalies could easily be straightened out with some exchanges of territory, making a more sensible border for all parties. We also wanted to leave open demilitarization measures in the Sinai and the Golan Heights and take a fresh look at the old city of Jerusalem. But we never contemplated any significant grant of territory to Israel as a result of the June 1967 war. On that point we and the Israelis to this day remain sharply divided. This situation could lead to real trouble in the future. Although every President since Harry Truman has committed the United States to the security and independence of Israel, I'm not aware of any commitment the United States has made to assist Israel in retaining territories seized in the Six-Day War.

A memorandum from the President's Special Assistant, Walt Rostow to President Johnson said "What's on the Arab Ambassadors' minds boils down to one big question: Will we make good on our pledge to support the territorial integrity of all states in the Middle East? Our best answer is that we stand by that pledge, but the only way to make good on it is to have a genuine peace. The tough question is whether we'd force Israel back to 4 June borders if the Arabs accepted terms that amounted to an honest peace settlement. Secretary Rusk told the Yugoslav Foreign Minister: 'The US had no problem with frontiers as they existed before the outbreak of hostilities. If we are talking about national frontiers--in a state of peace--then we will work toward restoring them.' But we all know that could lead to a tangle with the Israelis."

Rusk met with Foreign Minister Nikezic on August 30, 1967. However, according to telegram 30825 to Belgrade, September 1, which summarizes the conversation, Rusk said the key to a settlement was to end the state of war and belligerence and that if a way could be found to deal with this, other things would fall into place; the difference between pre-June 5 positions and secure national boundaries was an important difference.

President Johnson responded to a complaint from President Tito that Israel could change the frontiers without Arab consent: "You note that the Arabs feel the US interprets the draft resolution to imply a change of frontiers to their detriment. We have no preconceptions on frontiers as such. What we believe to be important is that the frontiers be secure. For this the single most vital condition is that they be acceptable to both sides. It is a source of regret to us that the Arabs appear to misunderstand our proposal and misread our motives."

Furthermore, Secretary Rusk's Telegram dated March 2, 1968 to the U.S. Interests Section of the Spanish Embassy in Cairo summarizing Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow’s conversation with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin states:

Rostow said ... resolution required agreement on "secure and recognized" boundaries, which, as practical matter, and as matter of interpreting resolution, had to precede withdrawals. Two principles were basic to Article I of resolution. Paragraph from which Dobrynin quoted was linked to others, and he did not see how anyone could seriously argue, in light of history of resolution in Security Council, withdrawal to borders of June 4th was contemplated. These words had been pressed on Council by Indians and others, and had not been accepted. Rusk

In an address delivered on September 1, 1982 President Ronald Reagan said:

In the pre-1967 borders Israel was barely 10 miles wide at its narrowest point. The bulk of Israel's population lived within artillery range of hostile Arab armies. I am not about to ask Israel to live that way again...

So the United States will not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, and we will not support annexation or permanent control by Israel.

There is, however, another way to peace. The final status of these lands must, of course, be reached through the give-and-take of negotiations; but it is the firm view of the United States that self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for a durable, just and lasting peace.

It is the United States' position that - in return for peace - the withdrawal provision of Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the West Bank and Gaza.

When the border is negotiated between Jordan and Israel, our view on the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization and the security arrangements offered in return.

Finally, we remain convinced that Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations.

According to Lynk there are three schools of thought concerning the proper legal interpretation of the withdrawal phrase. Some of the parties involved have suggested that the indefinite language is a “perceptible loophole”, that authorizes “territorial revision” for Israel’s benefit. Some have stated that the indefinite language was used to permit insubstantial and mutually beneficial alterations to the 1949 armistices lines, but that unilateral annexation of the captured territory was never authorized. Other parties have said that no final settlement obtained through force or the threat of force could be considered valid. They insist that the Security Council cannot create loopholes in peremptory norms of international law or the UN Charter, and that any use of indefinite language has to be interpreted in line with the overriding legal principles regarding the “inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war” and the prohibitions on mass deportations or displacement in connection with the settlement of the refugee problem.

Orakhelashvili says that the Security Council manifestly lacks the competence to validate agreements imposed through coercion, not least because the peremptory prohibition of the use of force is a limitation on the Council’s powers and the voidness of coercively imposed treaties is the clear consequence of jus cogens and the conventional law as reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A recent international study concluded that the ultimate status and boundaries will require negotiation between the parties, according to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The same study also found that the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention which govern ‘special agreements’ that can adversely affect the rights of protected persons precludes any change in status of the territory obtained through an agreement concluded during a state of belligerent occupation.