Aftermath
In June 2006, the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), a US Department of Defense entity, released a report detailing the weapons of mass destruction that had been found in Iraq, including pre-1991 sarin gas and mustard agent. The report stated that, "While agents degrade over time, chemical warfare agents remain hazardous and potentially lethal."
The Bush administration commissioned the Iraq Survey Group to determine whether in fact any WMD existed in Iraq. After a year and half of meticulously combing through the country, the administration’s own inspectors reported:
| “ | "While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy ISG attributes to Baghdad’s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should WMD be discovered." | ” |
The review was conducted by Charles Duelfer and the Iraq Survey Group. In October 2004, Bush said of Duelfer’s analysis: "The chief weapons inspector, Charles Duelfer, has now issued a comprehensive report that confirms the earlier conclusion of David Kay that Iraq did not have the weapons that our intelligence believed were there."
Factual questions about the Iraqi declaration still remain. To date the contents have still not been made public for independent scrutiny. When the UK government was asked to state where in the Iraqi government's declaration there were false or inaccurate statements, the reply was that it was a confidential matter and that "huge quantities of documents remain to be translated."
Read more about this topic: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441
Famous quotes containing the word aftermath:
“The aftermath of joy is not usually more joy.”
—Mason Cooley (b. 1927)