State Duma - History

History

The State Duma was introduced in 1906 and was Russia's first elected parliament. The first two attempts by Tsar Nicholas II to make it active were ineffective. Subsequently each of the Dumas were dissolved after only a few months. After the 1907 electoral reform, the third Duma, elected in November 1907, was largely made up of members of the upper classes, as radical influences in the Duma had almost entirely been removed. The establishment of the Duma after the 1905 Revolution was to herald significant changes to the Russian autocratic system. Furthermore the Duma was later to have an important effect on Russian history, as it was one of the contributing factors in the February Revolution, which led to the abolition of autocracy in Russia.

In the December 1993 elections pro-Yeltsin parties won 175 seats in the Duma versus 125 seats for the left bloc. The balance of power lay with the sixty four deputies of the semi-fascist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Only parties that won more than five percent of the vote were given party-list seats: eight passed the threshold in 1993. In addition to those eight parties, a pool of thirty five deputies was entitled to form a registered group to reflect regional or sectoral interests. Business was governed by a steering committee, the Duma Council, consisting of one person from each party or group. The most important task was dividing up the chair positions in the Duma’s twenty three committees, which was done as part of a power-sharing "package" deal.

In none of the Dumas elected in 1993, 1995 and 1999 was one party able to form a majority, so the chamber was mired in factional bickering and was unable to impose order on the work of its committees. Too many bills were introduced - less than half made it to the first reading. During most of the Yeltsin era the anti-Yeltsin camp was strong enough to block government legislative initiatives, while the pro-Yeltsin camp was fractured and lacked institutional ties to the executive branch. Less than half the bills passed originated as government proposals. Yeltsin vetoed twenty percent of all bills in 1996–1999, and in half the cases the veto was not overridden. The Russian public developed a strongly unfavorable image of the Duma. Meanwhile, Yeltsin continued to pursue his policies by decree – an example is the privatisation auctions and the Chechnya invasion in 1994. Each year 1995–2001 the Duma refused to approve the federal budget in advance, so the government proceeded through sequestration.

A deterioration in Duma–-president relations occurred due to Yeltsin’s dismissal of Victor Chernomyrdin from the post of prime minister in March 1998. Although the appointment of Chernomyrdin’'s successor, Sergei Kiriyenko, was also a source of division, the new prime minister’s support for stringent fiscal measures, coupled with a deteriorating economic situation, appeared to galvanize the leftist alliance. During this period, the Communist Party leadership pursued a more confrontational stance towards the executive.

The August 1998 financial crash was a major political blow for Yeltsin, and undermined the fortunes of many of the oligarchs who were an important pillar of support for the president. In the wake of the crisis Yeltsin was forced to dismiss Prime Minister Sergey Kirienko and reluctantly accepted Yevgeny Primakov as his replacement. Primakov, a former spy chief and foreign minister, was a candidate acceptable to the Communist-led Duma. This was perhaps the high point of parliamentary influence during the whole post-Soviet period. In spring 1999 the Federation Council refused to accept Yeltsin’s dismissal of General Prosecutor Yuri Skuratov, who was investigating Boris Berezovsky, a leading oligarch and backer of Yeltsin. In May 1999 Yeltsin struck back by firing Primakov, who went on to lead an anti-Yeltsin coalition of regional bosses, the Fatherland-All Russia movement.

During the second half of the 1990s the Duma became an important forum for lobbying by regional leaders and businessmen looking for tax breaks and legislative favors. The work of the leading committees, such as those for defense, foreign affairs, or budget, attracted a good deal of media attention and lobbying activity.

In the early 2000s, following the 1999 parliamentary elections Pro-presidential Unity party and the Communist Party of the Russian Federation were the leading forces in the State Duma. Frustrated by the lack of cooperation between natural coalition partners in the early organization of the Duma, Putin ordered Unity to negotiate a secret deal with the Communists. The deal provided for the election of Communist leader Gennady Seleznyev as speaker and the division of committee chairmanship between the two parties and marginalized Union of Rightist Forces, Fatherland, Yabloko, and Russia’s Regions, which divided only five committee positions among them. As a result of this deal, the Communists retained some influence over the Duma.

But in April 2002 Unity stopped cooperating with the Communists and Unity, which renamed itself the United Russia party, took a majority in the Duma Council. Vacant leadership positions were reallocated to loyal factions (Fatherland, Union of Rightist Forces, Yabloko, and Russian Regions), increasing their access to resources and removing the Communist capacity to mount opposition from within the Duma. In response to the changes, Unity faction leader Pekhtin publicly celebrated the end of the reign of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.