Second Battle of El Alamein - Background

Background

By 12 July 1942, after its success at the Battle of Gazala, the Panzer Army Africa (Panzerarmee Afrika), composed of German and Italian infantry and mechanised units under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, had struck deep into Egypt, threatening the British Empire's control of the Suez Canal. General Auchinleck withdrew the Eighth Army to within 50 mi (80 km) of Alexandria to a point where the Qattara Depression came to within 40 mi (64 km) of El Alamein on the coast. This gave the defenders a relatively short front to defend and secure flanks, because tanks could not traverse the Depression. Here, in early July, the Axis advance was halted in the First Battle of El Alamein.

Eighth Army counter-offensives during July were unsuccessful, as Rommel dug in to allow his exhausted troops to regroup. At the end of July, Auchinleck called off all offensive action with a view to rebuilding the army’s strength. In early August, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and General Sir Alan Brooke—the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff—visited Cairo and replaced Auchinleck as C-in-C Middle East with General Sir Harold Alexander. Lieutenant-General William Gott was to command the Eighth Army, but was killed before taking command when the transport plane he was travelling in was shot down by Luftwaffe fighters; Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery became Eighth Army commander.

Faced with overextended supply lines and a relative lack of reinforcements, and well aware of massive allied reinforcements in men and material on the way, Rommel decided to strike the Allies while their build-up was incomplete. The two armoured divisions of Afrika Korps and a force made up of the reconnaissance units of Panzer Army Africa spearheaded the attack but, on 30 August 1942, the Allies stopped them at Alam el Halfa ridge and Point 102. The attack failed in this second battle at the Alamein line, better known as the Battle of Alam el Halfa (commonly but incorrectly Alam Halfa); expecting a counter-attack by Montgomery's Eighth Army, Panzer Army Africa dug in.

The factors that had favoured the Eighth Army's defensive plan in the First Battle of El Alamein, the short front line and the secure flanks, now favoured the Axis on defence. Rommel, furthermore, had plenty of time to prepare his defensive positions and lay extensive minefields (approximately 500,000 mines) and barbed wire. Alexander and Montgomery were determined to establish a superiority of forces sufficient not only to achieve a breakthrough but also to exploit it and destroy Panzer Army Africa. In all the previous swings of the pendulum in the Western Desert since 1941, neither side had ever had the strength after achieving victory in an offensive battle to exploit it decisively: the losing side had always been able to withdraw and regroup closer to its main supply bases.

After six more weeks of building up its forces, Eighth Army was ready to strike. 220,000 men and 1,100 tanks under Montgomery made their move against the 115,000 men and 559 tanks of Panzer Army Africa.