Sassoon Eskell - The Creation of Iraq

The Creation of Iraq

In 1920, after the end of the First World War, Sir Sassoon returned to Baghdad from Istanbul and was appointed Minister of Finance in the first Iraqi government, a new provisional government under the premiership of Abd Al-Rahman Al-Naqib. The importance of his role was what was to make or break the new constitution of Iraq. The details of this were highlighted by Gertrude Bell when she recounted the circumstances regarding the establishment of Iraq’s new government. Dated 1 November 1920, Bell wrote:

“On Wednesday morning all seemed to be going well. In the afternoon Major Yetts and I went out sightseeing in Baghdad and on our way home dropped in to tea with the Tods. Mr Tod sprung upon us that he had called on Sasun Eff to congratulate him on his becoming Minister of Finance and found him with Hamdi Pasha Baban (who had been offered a seat in the Cabinet without portfolio,) both in the act of refusing. Mr Tod had done his best to persuade them but had heard in the afternoon that they had refused, the real, though not the expressed reason, being that they would not join a Cabinet which contained Saiyid Talib. While both were important, Sasun Eff was absolutely essential. His refusal would damn the Cabinet as a Talib ministry and doom it to failure from the outset. I left my cup of tea undrunk and rushed back to the office to tell Mr Philby. He wasn't there, but there was a light in Sir Percy's room. I went in and told him. He bade me go at once to Sasun Eff and charged me to make him change his mind. I set off feeling as if I carried the future of the 'Iraq in my hands, but when I got to Sasun's house to my immense relief I found Mr Philby and Capt Clayton already there. The Naqib had got Sasun's letter and had sent Mr Philby off post haste. I arrived, however, in the nick of time. They had exhausted all their arguments and Sasun still adhered to his decision. I think my immense anxiety must have inspired me for after an hour of concentrated argument he was visibly shaken, in spite of the fact that his brother Sha'al (whom I also admire and respect) came in and did his best against us. Finally however we persuaded him that Sir Percy had no desire to thrust Talib or anyone else upon Mesopotamia, but that Talib like everyone else must be given his chance. If he proved valuable he would take his part in the foundation of national institutions, if not he was politically a dead man. We got Sasun Eff to consent to think it over and to come and see Sir Percy next day. I had an inner conviction that the game was won - partly, thank heaven, to the relations of trust and confidence which I personally had already established with Sasun - but we none of us could feel sure. You will readily understand that I didn't sleep much that night. I turned and turned in my mind the arguments I had used and wondered if I could not have done better. Next morning, Thursday, Sasun Eff. came in at 10; I took him straight to Sir Percy and left them. Half an hour later, he returned and told me that he had accepted and I understood the full significance of the Nunc Dimittis. He asked me what he could now do to help and I sent him straight to the Naqib. The leading Shi'ah of Baghdad had also refused to join the Council and it was essential to get him in. In the midst of this talk Sir Percy sent for me. I left Sasun to Mr Philby and went to consult with Sir Percy. We agreed that I should send at once for Ja'far, tell him what had happened and bid him bestir himself. It was past one o'clock before I caught Ja'far. We had the most extraordinary conversation. He told me he had come into the Cabinet, only to defeat Talib, that he distrusted and loathed him and regarded it as shameful that he should be one of the leading persons of Mesopotamia. I said that the Mesopotamians themselves had made him, by their fear and their servility, and that it was for them to unmake him if they wished. We then discussed how to win over the extremists, I assured him that that was Sir Percy's chief desire and taking heart, he asked if he might talk to Sir Percy. I took him at once to Sir Percy and left them together, with the assured conviction that Sir Percy was the best exponent of his own policy.”… “Oh, if we can pull this thing off! rope together the young hotheads, and the Shi'ah obscurantists, and enthusiasts like Ja'far, polished old statesmen like Sasun, and scholars like Shukri - if we can make them work together and find their own salvation for themselves, what a fine thing it will be. I see visions and dream dreams. But as we say in Arabic countless times a day "Through the presence of His Excellency the Representative of the King, and with the help of the Great Government, all please God, must be well!"

“The Council of State of the first Arab government in Mesopotamia since the (thirteenth century) Abbasid’s” as Bell described it, met on Tuesday, 2 November 1920. Along with Sir Sassoon as Minister of Finance, Jafar Pasha al-Askari as Minister of Defence and six other ministers including Sayid Talib as Minister of the Interior. The next step was to choose a King to unite the tribally fractured country. Sir Sassoon had already offered his opinions on the matter as was recounted again by Miss Bell:

“I had a long and interesting talk with Sasun Eff. the other day - I went to call on his sister in law and found all the men there eager to embark on talk. Sasun Eff. said he felt sure that no local man would be acceptable as head of the state because every other local man would be jealous of him. He went on to throw out feelers in different directions - one might think of a son of the Sharif, or a member of the family of the Sultan of Egypt, if there was a suitable individual, or of the family of the Sultan of Turkey? I said I for my part felt sure that Sir Percy didn't and couldn't mind whom they selected except that I thought the Turkish family was ruled out - it ought to be an Arab prince. Sasun Eff. said "If they think you are backing S. Talib they will all agree outwardly to S. Talib, whatever they think of him. I remember when once I happened to be on the same boat with him coming back from Constantinople - it was when S. Talib was a deputy. Almost without exception the people of Basrah hated and feared him, and if you'll believe me they all came down to Muhammarah to welcome him! and the ones that hated him most gave him the most cordial reception. They were afraid of him. So it would be now." I again insisted that we could find no interest or advantage in backing anyone; it was entirely a matter for the people themselves to decide, but whether he believed me or not I can't say. He had, however, hit on the root of the matter. Anyone they think we're backing they will agree to - and then intrigue against him without intermission. It's not an easy furrow to plough!”

To reach a final conclusion on the choice for ruler, Sir Winston Churchill, then British colonial secretary summoned a small group of Orientalists to Egypt for the famous Cairo Conference of March 1921. The British Empire’s best minds on the Middle East would determine the fate of Mesopotamia, Transjordan and Palestine. Churchill’s objectives were to save money by reducing Britain's overseas military presence; Find a way to maintain political control over Britain's mandate areas as identified in the Sykes-Picot Agreement; Protect what was then suspected to be substantial oil reserves in Iraq; and lastly preserve an open trade route to India, the Crown Jewel of the empire. Representing the Iraqi’s, two members of the Council were picked to join the delegation: Sir Sassoon Eskell and Jafar Pasha al-Askari; with the disliked Sayid Talib left behind. It was at this conference, with Sir Sassoon’s and Jafar Pasha’s approval that Emir Faisal was chosen for the throne of Iraq.