In modal logic and the philosophy of language, a term is said to be a rigid designator (or Kripkean soul) when it designates (picks out, denotes, refers to) the same thing in all possible worlds in which that thing exists and does not designate anything else in those possible worlds in which that thing does not exist. A designator is persistently rigid if it designates the same thing in every possible world in which that thing exists and designates nothing in all other possible worlds. A designator is obstinately rigid if it designates the same thing in every possible world, period, whether or not that thing exists in that world. Rigid designators are contrasted with non-rigid or flaccid designators, which may designate different things in different possible worlds.
Read more about Rigid Designator: Proper Names and Definite Descriptions, Essentialism, Causal-Historical Theory of Reference, Necessary Identities
Famous quotes related to rigid designator:
“Let’s call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, a non-rigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. Of course we don’t require that the objects exist in all possible worlds.... When we think of a property as essential to an object we usually mean that it is true of that object in any case where it would have existed. A rigid designator of a necessary existent can be called strongly rigid.”
—Saul Kripke (b. 1940)