Reserve Power - Constitutional Monarchies

Constitutional Monarchies

Heads of state in countries with either an uncodified or partly unwritten constitution (such as the United Kingdom or Canada) or a wholly written constitution that consists of a text augmented by additional conventions, traditions, letters patent, etc. (such as Australia) generally have reserve powers.

Typically these powers are:

• to grant pardon;
• to dismiss a Prime Minister;
• to refuse to dissolve Parliament;
• to refuse or delay the Royal Assent to legislation. To withhold the Royal Assent amounts to a veto of a Bill. To reserve the Royal Assent in effect amounts to a decision neither to grant nor refuse assent, but to delay taking a decision for an undetermined period of time.

There are usually strict constitutional conventions concerning when these powers may be used, and these conventions are enforced by public pressure. Using these powers in contravention of tradition would generally provoke a constitutional crisis.

Some political scientists believe that reserve powers are a good thing in that they allow for a government to handle an unforeseen crisis and that the use of convention to limit the use of reserve powers allows for more gradual and subtle constitutional evolution than is possible through formal amendment of a written constitution. Others believe that reserve powers are vestigial and potentially dangerous parts of a constitution.

Reserve powers often originate in situations in which the head of state begins with vast discretionary powers which over time become more difficult to execute in practice without provoking a constitutional crisis. As a society becomes more democratic, conventions and limitations on the power of the head of state become increasingly established and constitutional evolution occurs by establishing conventions rather than by formal amendment of the constitution. As a result, reserve powers often exist in the context of constitutional monarchies.