Quebec Veto Reference (Reference re Amendment to the Canadian Constitution) 2 S.C.R. 793 is a Supreme Court of Canada opinion on whether there is a constitutional convention giving the province of Quebec a veto over Amendments to the Constitution of Canada. The issue arose during patriation debates, after the Supreme Court ruled in the Patriation Reference that there is a constitutional convention requiring "a substantial degree of provincial consent" for amendments to the Constitution of Canada.
In November 1981, the Government of Quebec ordered that a reference be taken in the Quebec Court of Appeal, asking whether the consent of the Province of Quebec is required, by constitutional convention, for constitutional amendments affecting the legislative competence of the Quebec legislature, or the status or role of Quebec's government or legislature.
On April 7, 1982, the Quebec Court of Appeal answered in the negative. By that time, the Canada Act 1982 had already been passed by the UK Parliament, though not proclaimed in force. On April 13, 1982, the Attorney General of Quebec appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada, but on April 17, 1982, the Canada Act 1982 was proclaimed in force by the Queen.
In June 1982 the Supreme Court heard the appeal. On December 6, 1982, the Supreme Court rendered judgement, upholding the opinion of the Quebec Court of Appeal that Quebec did not have a veto by constitutional convention.
Famous quotes containing the words veto and/or reference:
“The veto is a President’s Constitutional right, given to him by the drafters of the Constitution because they wanted it as a check against irresponsible Congressional action. The veto forces Congress to take another look at legislation that has been passed. I think this is a responsible tool for a president of the United States, and I have sought to use it responsibly.”
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“A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen.”
—Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914)