Kripke's Interpretation
In 1982 Saul Kripke published a new and innovative account of the argument in his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Kripke takes the paradox discussed in ยง201 to be the central problem of the Philosophical Investigations. He develops the paradox into a Grue-like problem, arguing that it similarly results in skepticism, but about meaning rather than about induction. He proposes a new form of addition, which he calls quus, which is identical with plus in all cases except those in which either of the numbers to be added are greater than 57, thus:
He then asks if anyone could know that previously when I thought I had meant plus, I had not actually meant quus. He claims that his argument shows that "Each new application we make is a leap in the dark; any present intention could be interpreted so as to accord with anything we may choose to do. So there can be neither accord, nor conflict".
Kripke's account is considered by some commentators to be unfaithful to Wittgenstein, and as a result has been referred to as "Kripkenstein".
Read more about this topic: Private Language Argument
Famous quotes containing the word kripke:
“Certainly the philosopher of ‘possible worlds’ must take care that his technical apparatus not push him to ask questions whose meaningfulness is not supported by our original intuitions of possibility that gave the apparatus its point.”
—Saul Kripke (b. 1940)