Penalty Kick - Tactics

Tactics

Defending against a penalty kick is one of the most difficult tasks a goalkeeper can face. Owing to the short distance between the penalty spot and the goal, there is very little time to react to the shot. Because of this, the goalkeeper will usually start his or her dive before the ball is actually struck. In effect, the goalkeeper must act on his best prediction about where the shot will be aimed. Some keepers decide which way they will dive beforehand, thus giving themselves a good chance of diving in time. Others try to read the kicker's motion pattern. On the other side, kickers often feign and prefer a relatively slow shot in an attempt to foil the keeper. The potentially most fruitful approach, shooting high and center, i.e. in the space that the keeper will evacuate, also carries the highest risk of shooting above the bar.

As the shooter makes his approach to the ball, the keeper has only a few seconds to "read" the shooter's motions and decide where the ball will go. If their guess is correct, this may result in a saved penalty. Helmuth Duckadam, the goalkeeper of Steaua Bucureşti, saved a record four consecutive penalties in the 1986 European Cup Final against FC Barcelona. He dived three times to the right and a fourth time to his left to save all penalties taken, securing victory for his team.

A goalkeeper may also rely on knowledge of the shooter's past behavior to inform his decision. An example of this would be by former Netherlands national team goalkeeper Hans van Breukelen, who always had a box with cards with all the information about the opponents penalty specialist. Another example is Portugal national team goalkeeper Ricardo in a match against England in the 2006 FIFA World Cup, where he saved three penalties. In another example, Ecuadorian goalkeeper Marcelo Elizaga, after saving a penalty from Carlos Tévez in a match between their national teams, revealed that he had studied some penalty kicks from Tévez and suspected he was going to shoot to the goalkeeper left side. The match between Argentina and Germany also came down to penalties, and Jens Lehmann was seen looking at a piece of paper kept in his sock before each Argentinian player would come forward for a penalty kick. It is presumed that information on each kicker's "habits" were written on this paper. This approach may not always be successful; the player may intentionally switch from his favoured spot after witnessing the goalkeeper obtaining knowledge of his kicks. Most times, especially in amateur football, the goalkeeper is often forced to guess. A 2011 study published in the journal Psychological Science found goalkeepers dove to the right 71% of the time when their team was losing, but only 48% when ahead and 49% when tied, a phenomenon believed to be related to certain right-preferring behavior in social mammals.

The goalkeeper also may try to distract the penalty taker, as the expectation is on the penalty taker to succeed, hence more pressure on the penalty taker, making him more vulnerable to mistakes. For example, in the 2008 UEFA Champions League Final between Manchester United and Chelsea, United goalkeeper Edwin van der Sar pointed to his left side when Nicolas Anelka stepped up to take a shot in the penalty shoot out. This was because all of Chelsea's penalties went to the left. Anelka's shot instead went to Van der Sar's right, which was saved. Liverpool goalkeeper Bruce Grobbelaar used a famous method of distracting the players called the "spaghetti legs" trick to help his club defeat Roma to win the 1984 European Cup. This tactic was emulated in the 2005 UEFA Champions League Final, which Liverpool also won, by Liverpool's goalkeeper Jerzy Dudek, helping his team defeat AC Milan.

An illegal method of saving penalties is for the goalkeeper to make a quick and short jump forward just before the penalty taker connects with the ball. This not only shuts down the angle of the shot, but also distracts the penalty taker. The method was used by Brazilian goalkeeper Taffarel. FIFA was less strict on the rule during that time. In more recent times, FIFA has advised all referees to strictly obey the rule book.

Similarly, a goalkeeper may also attempt to delay a penalty by cleaning his boots, asking the referee to see if the ball is placed properly and other delaying tactics. This method builds more pressure on the penalty taker, but the goalkeeper may risk punishments, most likely a yellow card.

Even if the keeper does manage to block the shot, the ball may rebound back to the shooter or one of his teammates for another shot, with the keeper often in poor position to make a second save. This makes saving penalty kicks astonishingly difficult. This is not a concern in penalty shoot-outs, where just a single shot is permitted.

These factors would give one the impression that penalty kicks are scored almost 100% of the time. Missed penalty kicks, however, are not uncommon despite the simple circumstances. For instance, of the 78 penalty kicks taken during the 2005–06 English Premier League season, 57 resulted in a goal, meaning almost 30% of the penalties were unsuccessful.

A German professor who has been studying penalty statistics in the German Bundesliga for 16 years found that 76% of all the penalties during those 16 years went in, and 99% of the shots in the higher half of the goal went in, although the higher half of the goal is generally a more risky target to aim at. During his career, Italian striker Roberto Baggio had two occurrences where his shot hit the upper bar, bounced downwards, rebounded off the keeper and passed the goal line for a goal.