Pakistan Army - Combat Doctrine

Combat Doctrine

The Pakistan Army has developed a doctrine called the Riposte which is a limited "offensive-defence" doctrine. It has refined it consistently starting in 1989 during the "Exercise Zarb-e-Momin". This doctrine is fully focused towards Pakistan's archenemy, India.

The doctrine is derived from several factors:

1. The vulnerability of Pakistan is that so many of its major population centres and politically and military sensitive targets lie very close to the border with India. As such Pakistan can ill-afford to lose large territories to an Indian attack.
2. ‘Strategic depth’ in the form of a friendly Afghanistan is deemed vital by military planners.
3. India has substantially enhanced its offensive capabilities, with the Cold Start Doctrine. Any counterattack would be very tricky against the large number of Indian troops involved. The response of the Pakistani army includes the development of the Nasr missile.
4. Holding formations in both India and Pakistan can man their forward defensive positions and fortifications in less than 24 hours. However, Corps level reserves with large stockpiles of munitions will take between 24 to 72 hours for mobilisation after being given their orders. In this regard, both armies will be evenly matched in the first 24 hours since the Pakistani units have to travel a shorter distance to their forward positions.

This doctrine entails Pakistan in the event of hostilities with India will not wait for the enemy's offensive, but rather launch an offensive of its own. The offensive will be a limited advance along narrow fronts with the aim of occupying territory near the border to a depth of 40–50 km. Since Indian forces will not reach their maximum strength near the border for another 48–72 hours, Pakistan might have parity or numerical superiority against the Indians.

The Pakistani Army hopes to accomplish three things under this strategy:

1. The enemy is kept off-balance as it will be tied up containing the Pakistani offensive into its territory rather than launching an offensive into Pakistani territory.
2. The Pakistani Army hopes to contain the fighting on the Indian side of the border so that any collateral or other damage will be suffered by India.
3. Indian territory of strategic importance once seized, will give the Pakistani Army a bargaining chip to be used in the aftermath of a ceasefire brought about by international pressure after 3–4 weeks of fighting.
4. The use of tactical battlefield nuclear missile such as Nasr missile that provide maximal damage against massed troops for extremely limited collateral casualties.

Kashmir, Line of Control and the Northern Punjab areas are heavily fortified and ill-suited for large mechanised offensives. The most likely area where Pakistan might launch its offensive is the semi-desert and desert sectors in southern Punjab and Sindh provinces.

To supplement this doctrine, the Army in the 1990s created a strong centralised corps of reserves for its formations. The force is known as Army Reserve South and is a grouping of several powerful Corps from Pakistan's Order of Battle. These formations have been rapidly equipped with assets needed for mechanised capability. These reserve formations are dual-capable, meaning they can be used for offensive as well as defensive (holding) purposes. Pakistan has also increased its ammunition, fuel and other military stockpiles to last for 45 days in case of a conflict. During the 1965 war for instance, Pakistan only had 13-day reserves which hampered its military operations.

The possibility of a major war of the sort against which earlier doctrines had eveolved came into question after May 1998 when both sides overtly demonstrated their nuclear capability. The Kargil conflict and the military standoff with India in 2002 led to various stability theories being viewd with scepticism on both sides. India realised the need to drastically reduce the time taken to build up its forces from all over the country towards its western borders and strike early while Pakistani defences on the one hand and diplomatic manoeuvre on the other were still unprepared. To this end, the Cold Start Doctrine and its tactical extension, proactive operations were developed and practised by the Indian Army and later the Navy and the Airforce variants thereof. Against cold start and proactive operations, Pakistan began developing its response at the joint services level with notable changes in how the land forces viewed existential and future threat. The intellectual powerhouse for this was led by the Chielf of the Army Staff, the commandant of the Armed Forces War College, selected corps commanders and a team of senior brigadiers. The Azm-e-Nau (New Resolve) series of war games were conducted and a new doctrine evolved. These exrcises and war-games culminated in the massive Azm-e-Nau 3 which was conducted in the deserts of Bahawalpur and upper Punjab in April and May 2010. The Army set up a doctrines concepts and development division under a top brigadier to evelove high, mid and low level doctrines for the army. The Pakistan Army Doctrine, Pakistan Defence Doctrine and a series of publications were developed between 2010 and 2011. Pakistan Army Doctrine with its main authors General Hanif and Brigadier General Zaidi is an opensource document and as such marks a turning point in Pakistan Army's approach to warfare and warfighting in the wake of new challenges. Traditionally secretive and protective of its doctrines, the Pakistan Army Doctrine, when it becomes openly available, would be the first time that Pakistan allows greater insight to its strategic thinking, workings and the use of military power.