Operation Storm - Build-up To Operation Storm

Build-up To Operation Storm

A proposed peace plan, called Z-4 plan, which would give Serbs autonomy inside Croatia, was rejected by the Serbs in January 1995. Although a military action was expected, Milan Martić, the rebel Croatian Serb leader, and his staff, refused the Z-4 plan in hopes of uniting with the Bosnian Serbs (led by Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić) and Serbia.

The Croatian Serb army, the VSK, was significantly undermanned. Their front extended 600 km and their area of control extended 100 km to the rear, along the Bihać pocket in Bosnia. It had 55,000 soldiers to cover this front and defend the rear. 16,000 of the VSK's troops were stationed in eastern Slavonia, leaving only a theoretical maximum 39,000 to defend the main part of the RSK.

In contrast, the Croatian and Bosnian armies (the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina) had greatly strengthened their forces. They had re-equipped with more weaponry from former republics of the USSR, despite the arms embargoes that were in force, which Croatia saw as a political manoeuvre of pro-Serbian political forces to keep Croatia unarmed against hyper-armed Serbs and the JNA.

The Croatian forces had received instruction by a U.S.-based firm, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), headed by retired General Carl Vuono, which provided (along with French Foreign Legion organized training camp in Šepurine near Zadar) mainly the commissioned-officers training, but had no significant intelligence activities or professional influence on senior Croatian military strategy and tactics. Its engagement was approved by the U.S. government. They also had strategic advantages, with much shorter lines of communication than their enemies. These advantages were demonstrated in May 1995, when the Croatian Army rapidly overran a Serb-held area of SAO Western Slavonia in Operation Flash. Serb forces retaliated by attacking the capital Zagreb with Orkan missiles from the Krajina; killing 7 and wounding over 175 civilians.

After Operation Flash in May 1995, Serbian president Slobodan Milošević had made the decision to help Krajina with materiel, General Milan Mrkšić from Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the people of military age who were born in the Krajina. Neverthless, Krajina Serbs were seriously undermined by internal political conflicts.

In July 1995, the Croatian and Bosnian armies jointly captured the crucial western Bosnian towns of Glamoč, and Bosansko Grahovo, along with Livno's western villages. This cut vital Croatian Serb supply lines and effectively meant that the Croatian Serb capital of Knin was surrounded on three sides. The rebel Croatian Serbs joined the Bosnian Serbs (aided by Fikret Abdić's Bosniak rebels) in an offensive aimed at eliminating the Bihać pocket which had been surrounded since 1992 and held over 40,000 Bosnian refugees. The international community feared a repeat of a Srebrenica Genocide there. In his 2012 visit of Srebrenica, the Premier of Bihać's Una-Sana Canton Hamdija Lipovača reiterated that "we have to remember that a similar scenario could have happened in the Bihać pocket and we should be thankful that we had not become another Srebrenica."

The Croatian victory in July's Operation Summer '95 caused the Serbs in Krajina logistical problems as the road connecting the capitals of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs had been taken. Morale fell to an all time low and the Krajina market was closed under local government orders.

During the last week of July and the first few days of August 1995, the Croatian Army undertook a massive military build-up along the front lines in the Krajina and western Slavonia.

On 31 July 1995, a meeting of Croatia’s top military and political leadership was held on the island of Brijuni. Franjo Tuđman's statements including "to inflict such blows that the Serbs will all practical purposes disappear, that is to say, the areas we do not take at once must capitulate within a few days." were subsequently analyzed in the ICTY trial of Gotovina et al.

Before the beginning of Operation Storm, both sides were present at peace talks in Switzerland on 3 August 1995. Croatia's demand was for the Croatian Serb rebels to reintegrate into Croatia, which the Serbs refused, even though military action was expected.