Operation Epsom - Analysis

Analysis

VIII Corps, in battle for the first time had broken through strongly entrenched German positions and advanced nearly six miles. The Germans, throwing in their last reserves, had been able to achieve a defensive success at the operational level, containing the British offensive. Just over 4,000 casualties had been inflicted upon the British but the Germans had suffered more than 3,000 casualties. The German commanders had been forced to commit their armoured reserves piecemeal to meet threats as they developed, counterattacking at a disadvantage. Over 120 German tanks were destroyed, the organisation of their forces was disrupted and their offensive power much reduced. With few infantry divisions to relieve them, the panzer divisions were forced to remain in the front line rather than pulling back into reserve.

Operation Epsom has been analysed to varying degrees by many prominent military historians and commentators. As described by Stephen Ashley Hart, these analyses have passed through a number of stages. The post-war publication of memoirs by Allied generals led to rifts along partisan lines during the 1950s and 1960s, with American historians generally critical of Montgomery and the actions of the Anglo-Canadian forces, while "pro-Montgomery" historians set out to refute these criticisms. Also published during this period were the national official campaign histories which although thoroughly researched, for the most part avoided detailed critical analysis of the 1944–45 north-west European campaign's most controversial issues. During the 1980s, revisionist writers concentrated on the perceived deficiencies of the Allies' performance and from the late 1990s to the present, historians of the campaign in two schools of thought have been revising the revisionists, those attempting to expand on revisionist work by providing a more detailed campaign analysis and those who have attempted to demonstrate that the techniques employed by the Anglo-Canadian forces were appropriate to conditions in Normandy.

According to Carlo D’Este, the most logical point for the British to have launched an attack at this stage of the campaign would have been out of the Orne bridgehead on the extreme eastern flank of the Allied lodgement. An attack in this area had been considered—and vetoed—by Montgomery, Dempsey and O’Connor as unrealistic; instead Second Army turned its attention west of Caen. One of the more contentious points amongst historians is the question of what Operation Epsom was intended to achieve. Some claim that the aim was to gain ground, while others have suggested that the operation had wider objectives. Andrew Williams argues that due to ULTRA intercepts, Montgomery was aware of Rommel's planned attack towards Bayeux and Epsom was launched to forestall it. Chester Wilmot states that the operation was intended to draw the I SS Panzer Corps and the newly arrived II SS Panzer Corps into battle around Caen and Hart notes that Montgomery wanted to keep the operational and strategic initiative to prevent German armoured forces either being redeployed to face the Americans or being relieved and passed into reserve. The arrival of the II SS Panzer Corps acted as powerful incentive to launch Epsom, thus retaining the initiative by forcing the German command to commit the II SS Panzer Corps to battle rather than use it for their attack. These views are dismissed by Max Hastings, who claims that "no sane commander" would mount an attack as big as Epsom without "every hope of breaking through the German defences, or at least of causing the enemy to make substantial withdrawals". D’Este supports this view, stating "No amount of pretence can conceal that the real object had been a short pincer movement to outflank Caen".

Lloyd Clark writes: "On the battlefield, Epsom ended, rather ignominiously, in a sort of draw." The result of the offensive has also seen several conclusions. Clark notes that examining Operation Epsom's results is difficult when there is no agreement about its intentions; although Montgomery's written orders—to advance across the Orne River and capture the high ground south of Caen—were not achieved, he argues that there were also un-stated objectives that had strategic implications which far outweighed the simple capture of ground. Stephen Ambrose sees Operation Epsom veering off-course from its original plan, while D'Este goes so far as to say that Epsom was "an operation of immense intentions which were not attained", calling it a "dismal failure". Simon Trew notes that this 'failure' "took most of six Panzer Divisions to stop Epsom short of its final objectives", with Michael Reynolds adding that without the commitment of these six divisions, it was highly likely that the British offensive would have achieved its goals. Ian Daglish claims that while the original concept of Epsom had failed, the British had nonetheless won a strategic victory. By withdrawing the 11th Armoured Division across the Odon and then into reserve, the 21st Army Group had re-created the threat of an offensive near Caen and by the end of June all German armoured forces in Normandy were concentrated on the Second Army's front. Milton Shulman states that with the defeat of its second armoured counterattack during June, the German command had thrown away its most effective troops and Reynolds concedes that while the operation was costly for the British, it also "caused grievous losses" to the German force. VIII Corps, in its final analysis concluded that Epsom failed in its stated goal but "when seen as part of Montgomery's series of rapid and consecutive blows against the German Army in Normandy, the importance of Epsom becomes more apparent and there is little doubt that it did play a significant part in the Allies' eventual success in the region." D'Este dismisses any idea of wider strategic implications, claiming that the losses inflicted on the German army were "purely in terms of men and material".

Terry Copp has tried to explain the varying interpretations of Epsom by suggesting that too much emphasis has been given to analysing the offensive from a win-lose perspective, whereas a cost-benefit approach provides more useful conclusions. Describing the standard German practice of launching local counterattacks when driven from a position and thereby courting losses that could not be readily replaced, he writes: "One such counter-attack on 22 July resulted in 10SS regaining control of the Bon Repas -Évrecy road, a clear victory in a win-lose narrative but a typical German defeat in any cost–benefit analysis."