Operation Claret - Nature of Operations

Nature of Operations

The operations varied in size from 4 man special forces reconnaissance patrols to infantry fighting patrols in company strength, sometimes coordinated in a battalion operation. They included at least one 'permanent' Claret task, an artillery position (gun and observation post) astride the border ridge with authority to fire at any identifiable Indonesian forces inside Indonesia. Infantry tasks included fighting patrols inside Indonesia looking for opportunity 'contacts', attacks on Indonesian positions and ambushing tracks and rivers.

Initially, apart from special forces, only Gurkha infantry were used in company strength, and a battalion could only have one operation at a time. As experience and the situation developed these changed, and the Golden Rules on preparation and rehearsal, and the definition of thwarting offensive action relaxed. So too was the need for 'sworn secrecy', if it ever existed, and an early ban on internal discussion of operations. In 1965 penetration limits were increased to 10,000 yards (9,100 m) and then 20,000 yards (18,000 m). Small amphibious raids on the flanks by Special Boat Service were also authorised.

Infantry operations were usually, if not always, within artillery range. Their depth was also affected by the threat of interception while withdrawing, greater when the Indonesian troop density was higher as it was in the areas south of Kuching. Another constraint was the limited range of man-pack VHF radios A41 & 42, (copies of AN/PRC 9 & 10) and mountainous terrain in some areas. However, A510, an Australian made small HF radio using continuous wave (i.e. Morse code) was used in some areas and new A13 HF radios appeared in early 1966.

Intelligence for these operations came from several sources. These included SAS patrols, Border Scouts (many of whom had relatives in Kalimantan), information from locals gathered by Border Scouts, Military Intelligence Officers and Field Intelligence NCOs, and probably police Special Branch and others. SIGINT collection is unknown.

Infantry operations typically lasted 5 to 10 days. The fighting patrols had to be self-contained and carry all their ammunition and rations. Normal practice was to withdraw after a contact, but staying in the area often led to further ambushing opportunities. Ambushes were the most common tactic, often lasting several days. However, Indonesians did not usually move at night so ambushes could withdraw to a harbour position. Because aircraft were not allowed to fly across the border casualties had to be evacuated by foot until they were back across the border, except in the most extreme cases with personal authorisation by DOBOPS.

Fire support for Claret operations was mostly provided by artillery and, if the target was close to the border and in range, infantry mortars. These were sometimes moved to temporary positions in the border area. The mortars changed from 3-inch to 81mm with double the range around the end of 1965. Aircraft were not allowed to cross the border. A UK or Australian frigate was the 'guard ship' at Tawau at the eastern end of the border and an artillery amphibious observation party was available to control its fire, however it does not seemed to have fired in support of Claret operations.

Artillery support was unconventional because there were significantly more infantry battalions than batteries so the normal direct support relationship was not possible everywhere. Secondly, almost all guns were deployed singly in company or platoon bases. These sections did their own technical fire control and responded directly to fire orders from observers. This meant that most Claret operations were supported by only a single gun, which in turn meant that each gun had far more than its standard scale of ammunition.

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