Operation Biting - Prelude

Prelude

In order to effectively neutralise the Würzburg system by developing counter-measures against it, Jones and his team needed to study one of the systems, or at very least the more vital pieces of technology that the system was composed of. Fortunately for Jones, one such site had recently been located by an RAF reconnaissance Spitfire from the Photographic Reconnaissance Unit during a flight over part of the Channel coast near Le Havre. The site was located on a cliff-top immediately north of the village of Bruneval, which was itself twelve miles north of Le Havre, and was the most accessible German radar site that had been located so far by the British; several other installations had been located in France, but were landlocked, and others were as far away as Romania and Bulgaria. A request was therefore passed along to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the commander of Combined Operations, that a raid be mounted against the Bruneval installation and that a Würzburg radar system be captured and brought back to Britain for study. Mountbatten in turn took the proposal to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, who approved the raid after a brief debate. Having received permission to conduct the raid, Mountbatten and his staff studied the Bruneval installation and its defences, rapidly coming to the conclusion that due to the extensive coastal defences erected in the area around the installation it was too well-guarded to permit a commando raid. They considered that such a raid would be costly in terms of casualties for the commando force and would not be fast enough to capture the Würzburg radar before it was destroyed. Believing that surprise and speed were to be the essential requirements of any raid against the installation to ensure the radar was captured, Mountbatten saw an airborne assault as the only viable method. On 8 January 1942, he therefore contacted the headquarters of 1st Airborne Division and 38 Wing RAF, asking if they were able to conduct the raid; Browning was particularly enthusiastic, as a successful operation would be an excellent morale boost to the airborne troops under his command, as well as a good demonstration of their value.

The two commanders believed that training by both airborne troops and aircrews could be completed by the end of February, when there would be suitable meteorological conditions for such an operation to take place. Training for the raid was begun immediately, but encountered several problems. 38 Wing was a new formation and was unable to provide any aircraft or trained aircrews for the raid, meaning that No. 51 Squadron RAF under Wing Commander Percy Charles Pickard was selected to provide the aircraft and aircrew needed for the operation, although Group Captain Nigel Norman would remain in overall command. Another problem encountered was the state of the company of airborne troops chosen to raid the installation. During this period, 1st Airborne Division was composed of only two parachute battalions, of which only one, 1st Parachute Battalion, was fully trained; Major-General Browning, wishing to keep 1st Parachute Battalion intact for any larger operation the division might be selected for, ordered 2nd Parachute Battalion to provide a company for the operation. 'C' Company, commanded by Major John Frost was selected, but the company had been so recently formed that Major Frost and many of his men had not yet completed their parachute jumping course. The level of security imposed on the planning for the raid was so high that when Major Frost was first briefed by a liaison officer from the headquarters of 1st Airborne Division, he was informed that his company was to take part in an airborne warfare demonstration for the War Cabinet. He was also informed that C company would be divided into four sections for the exercise, which went against a plan Frost had devised for the exercise and confused him. It was only after Frost raised several objections with a more senior officer at the headquarters that he was informed of the intended raid, after which the Major dropped his objections and turned his attention to training the company.

The company spent a period training on Salisbury Plain in Wiltshire, and then travelled to Inveraray in Scotland where they underwent specialised training on Loch Fyne, practising night embarkations on landing craft. After finishing this training, which was designed to prepare the company for being evacuated by sea after raiding the radar installation, the company returned to Wiltshire and began carrying out practice parachute drops with the aircraft and aircrews of 51 Squadron. Despite the aircrews of the Squadron having no previous experience in dropping parachutists, these exercises proved to be successful. The company's training was aided by the creation of a scale-model of the radar installation and the surrounding buildings being built by the Photographic Interpretation Unit. During this period, Major Frost was introduced to Commander F. N. Cook of the Royal Australian Navy who would be commanding the naval force intended to evacuate the company at the completion of the raid, as well as to the party of thirty-two officers and men from No. 12 Commando who would remain in the landing craft and cover the company as it withdrew from the beach. Frost also met Flight Sergeant C.W.H Cox of the RAF, who had volunteered for the operation; as an expert radio mechanic, it would be his job to locate the Würzburg radar set and photograph it, as well as disassemble it for transportation back to Britain. Garrard had asked R. V. Jones to get Cox an Army uniform and number for the raid, as if they were captured and Cox was the only one in Air Force uniform he would be the object of special attention, but the War Office were obdurate.

Information about the Bruneval radar installation was also gathered during the training period, often with the help of the French resistance, without whom detailed knowledge of the disposition of the German forces guarding the installation would have been impossible. This reconnaissance was gathered by Gilbert Renault, known to the British by the code-name 'Remy' and several members of his resistance cell. The installation was composed of two distinct areas; a villa approximately 100 yards (91 m) from the edge of a cliff which contained the radar station itself, and an enclosure containing a number of smaller buildings which contained a small garrison. The Würzburg apparatus had been erected between the villa and the cliff. The radar station was permanently manned by signallers and was surrounded by a number of guard posts and approximately thirty guards; the buildings in the small enclosure housed approximately 100 German troops, including another detachment of signallers. A platoon of infantry was stationed to the north in Bruneval itself, and was responsible for manning the defences guarding the evacuation beach; these included a strong-point near the beach as well as pillboxes and machine-gun nests on the top of the cliff overlooking the beach. The beach was not mined and had only sporadic barbed-wire defences, but it was patrolled regularly, and a mobile reserve of infantry was believed to be available at one hour's notice and stationed some distance inland. On the basis of this information, Frost decided to divide the company into five groups of forty men for the raid, each named after a famous Royal Navy admiral: Nelson, Jellicoe, Hardy, Drake and Rodney. Nelson would clear and secure German positions defending the evacuation beach, whilst Jellicoe, Hardy and Drake would capture the radar site and a nearby villa occupied by Luftwaffe radar technicians and their guards; Rodney was the reserve formation, placed between the radar site and the main likely enemy approach to block any counter-attack. It was considered that the combination of a full moon, for visibility, and a rising tide, to allow the landing craft to manoeuvre in shallow water, was vital for the success of the raid, which narrowed the possible dates to a four day period between 24–27 February. On 23 February, a final rehearsal exercise took place, which proved to be a drastic failure; despite ideal weather conditions, the landing craft meant to evacuate the airborne troops became grounded 60 yards (180 ft) offshore and could not be shifted despite the efforts of all of C company.