Oakland Firestorm of 1991 - Firefighting Response and Difficulties

Firefighting Response and Difficulties

Assistance from firefighting agencies as far north as the Oregon state line, as far south as Bakersfield and as far east as the Nevada state line were quickly mobilized and sent to the fire zone. The California Department of Forestry (CDF) dispatched several air tankers, which doused the fire with tons of fire retardant all day long. The CDF established a base at the Naval Air Station in Alameda. Additionally, the Naval Air Station itself sent its own firefighting equipment and material to the scene of the fire. The next morning, before full control had been gained, satellite photographs, especially infrared (heat-sensing) photographs, were provided with the help of NASA Ames Research Center's Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (DART) to aid firefighters in plotting the extent of the fire and spotting hidden hot spots.

If this fire were looked at in terms of alarm assignments, it was the equivalent of a 107-alarm fire.

For a variety of reasons, the firefighting teams were initially overwhelmed by the firestorm. The winds were gusting at times in excess of 70 mph (110 km/h), creating erratic and extreme fire behavior. Flames took out power lines to seventeen pumping stations in the Oakland water system. Outside fire teams faced various equipment compatibility issues such as hydrants having the wrong size outlets for the hoses used by neighboring counties. Oakland was also not able to communicate with many mutual aid resources due to antiquated equipment and lack of access to statewide radio frequencies brought on by the budget restrictions in the preceding years. In some areas, firefighters simply ran out of water as there was no power to refill the emptied reservoirs. Additionally, many narrow, windy roads in the area were crowded with parked cars, including many in front of fire hydrants; this prevented fire trucks and ambulances from getting to certain areas and connecting fire hoses.

However, the most important factor was the rapid spread of the wind-driven fire. Before most of the firefighting resources could be brought to the scene, the fire had established a large perimeter. At the fire's peak, it destroyed one home every 11 seconds. By the first hour, the fire had destroyed nearly 790 structures. In addition to the winds and the heat, an important factor in the rapid spread of the fire was that it started in an area that was at an interface between developed and undeveloped land. Many of the first dwellings to burn were surrounded by thick, dry vegetation. In addition, the nearby undeveloped land had even more dry brush, along with several groves of non-native volatile eucalyptus trees.

The same conditions contributed to a major conflagration in nearby Berkeley in 1923 (named the 1923 Berkeley Fire) and a more limited conflagration in the same area in 1970.

As night descended, the firestorm threatened to destroy the historic Claremont Resort hotel where the media had gathered to report on the fire. Television crews trained their cameras on the dark hill immediately behind the hotel and millions watched as the fire slowly marched house by house towards the evacuated hotel. The fire was stopped shortly before it reached the hotel.

By 5:00pm the winds died down, giving firefighters a chance to get a handle on the blaze, though full containment would not be achieved until October 22. As many as 400 engine companies, 1500 personnel and 250 agencies worked to put out the fire.

By Wednesday October 23, at 8:00 am the fire was declared under control, almost 72 hours after it started.