Official Policy
Whether MAD was the officially accepted doctrine of the United States military during the Cold War is largely a matter of interpretation. The United States Air Force, for example, has retrospectively contended that it never advocated MAD as a sole strategy, and that this form of deterrence was seen as one of numerous options in U.S. nuclear policy. Former officers have emphasized that they never felt as limited by the logic of MAD (and were prepared to use nuclear weapons in smaller scale situations than "Assured Destruction" allowed), and did not deliberately target civilian cities (though they acknowledge that the result of a "purely military" attack would certainly devastate the cities as well). MAD was implied in several U.S. policies and used in the political rhetoric of leaders in both the U.S. and the USSR during many periods of the Cold War.
To continue to deter in an era of strategic nuclear equivalence, it is necessary to have nuclear (as well as conventional) forces such that in considering aggression against our interests any adversary would recognize that no plausible outcome would represent a victory or any plausible definition of victory. To this end and so as to preserve the possibility of bargaining effectively to terminate the war on acceptable terms that are as favorable as practical, if deterrence fails initially, we must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable, or in any event greater than his gains, from having initiated an attack.
— President Jimmy Carter in 1980, Presidential Directive 59, Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy
The doctrine of MAD was officially at odds with that of the USSRs policy which had, contrary to MAD, insisted survival was possible. The Soviets believed they could win, not only a nuclear war, but also the conventional war that they predicted would follow after their strategic nuclear arsenal had been depleted. Official Soviet policy though may have had internal critics towards the end of the Cold War, including some in the USSR's own leadership.
"Nuclear use would be catastrophic."
— 1981, the Soviet General Staff
Read more about this topic: Mutual Assured Destruction
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