Emotions and Reason
There are two main forms of moral rationalism, associated with two major forms of reasoning. If moral reasoning is based on theoretical reason, and is hence analogous to discovering empirical or scientific truths about the world, a purely emotionless being could arrive at the truths of reason. Such a being wouldn't necessarily be motivated to act morally. Beings who are motivated to act morally can also arrive at moral truths, but needn't rely upon their emotions to do so.
Many moral rationalists believe that moral reasoning is based on practical reason, which involves choices about what to do or intend to do, including how to achieve one's goals and what goals one should have in the first place. In this view, moral reasoning always involves emotional states and hence be intrinsically motivating. Immanuel Kant expressed this view when he said that immoral actions do not involve a contradiction in belief, but a contradiction in the will, that is, in one's commitment to a principle which one intends to motivate actions. Christine Korsgaard's elaboration of Kantian reasoning tries to show that if ethics is actually based on practical reasoning, this shows that it can be objective and universal, without having to appeal to questionable metaphysical assumptions.
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