Malayan Emergency - Comparisons With Vietnam

Comparisons With Vietnam

The conflicts in Malaya and Vietnam have been compared many times and it has been asked by historians how a British force of 35,000 succeeded where over half a million U.S. soldiers failed in a smaller area. The two conflicts differ in several key points.

• Whereas the MNLA never numbered more than about 8,000 insurgents, the Peoples' Army of (North) Vietnam fielded over a quarter-million soldiers, in addition to roughly 100,000 National Liberation Front (or Vietcong) guerillas.
• The combined support of the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China (PRC) provided large amounts of the latest military hardware, logistical support, personnel and training to North Vietnam.
• North Vietnam's shared border with its ally China (PRC) allowed for continuous assistance and resupply.
• The MNLA was isolated and without external supporters.
• The MNLA was politically isolated from the bulk of the population. It was, as mentioned above, a political movement almost entirely limited to ethnic Chinese; support among Muslim Malays and smaller tribes was scattered if existent at all. Malay nationalists supported the British because they promised independence in a Malay state; an MNLA victory would imply a state dominated by ethnic Chinese, and possibly a puppet state of Beijing or Moscow.
• Britain never approached the Emergency as a conventional conflict and quickly implemented an effective combined intelligence (led by Malayan Police Special Branch against the political arm of the guerrilla movement) and a "hearts and minds" operation.
• Many Malayans had fought side by side with the British against the Japanese occupation in World War II, including Chin Peng. This is in contrast to Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) where French colonial officials had not been at war against the Japanese, who endeavored to excite Vietnamese nationalism against France. This factor of trust between the locals and the colonials was what gave the British an advantage over the French and later, the Americans in Vietnam.
• In purely military terms, the British Army recognised that in a low-intensity war, the individual soldier's skill and endurance was of far greater importance than overwhelming firepower (artillery, air support, etc.) Even though many British soldiers were conscripted National Servicemen, the necessary skills and attitudes were taught at a Jungle Warfare School, which also worked out the optimum tactics based on experience gained in the field.
• In Vietnam, soldiers and supplies passed through external countries such as Laos and Cambodia where US forces were not legally permitted to enter. This allowed Vietnamese Communist troops safe haven from US ground attacks. The MNLA had no such advantage.