Khartoum Resolution - Interpretations

Interpretations

The resolution is frequently presented as an example of Arab rejectionism. Efraim Halevy, Guy Ben-Porat, Steven R. David, Julius Stone, and Ian Bremmer all agree the Khartoum Resolution amounted to a rejection of Israel's right to exist. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) itself enlisted the Khartoum Resolution to advocate against acceptance of Israel's right to exist as articulated in United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.

Benny Morris wrote that the Arab leaders "hammered out a defiant, rejectionist platform that was to bedevil all peace moves in the region for a decade." He laid some of the blame with Israel, saying, "n part stand was a response to Israel's unwillingness or inability to consider withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza as part of any peace settlement." Odd Bull of the UNTSO opined in much the same manner in 1976.

Avi Shlaim has argued that Arab spokesmen interpreted the Khartoum declarations to mean "no formal peace treaty, but not a rejection of peace; no direct negotiations, but not a refusal to talk through third parties; and no de jure recognition of Israel, but acceptance of its existence as a state" (emphasis in original). Shlaim states that the conference marked a turning point in Arab-Israeli relations, noting that Nasser urged Hussein to seek a "comprehensive settlement" with Israel. Shlaim acknowledges that none of this was known in Israel at the time, whose leaders took the "three nos" at face value.

In the event, indirect negotiations between Israel, Jordan and Egypt were eventually opened through the auspices of the Jarring Mission, and direct talks were also held in secret between Israel and Jordan, but neither avenue succeeded in achieving a meaningful settlement, setting the stage for a new round of conflict.