John Kerr (governor-general) - 1975 Crisis

1975 Crisis

Further information: 1975 Australian constitutional crisis

In October 1975 the Liberals used their Senate majority to defer voting on the supply bills until Whitlam agreed to hold an election for the House of Representatives, and a political crisis resulted. Whitlam refused to back down and call an early election, nor would Fraser give in and allow the budget bills to pass. If this impasse had gone on indefinitely, the government would have run out of money and been unable to fund its ongoing commitments, public-service, parliamentary and judicial costs. It was estimated that it would be late-November before this occurred. Whitlam was confident that at least some of the Liberal senators would back down if he held out long enough. Undoubtedly, he also surmised that public opinion could swing back his way as a result of Fraser's tactics and that, at an opportune moment, he could call a half-Senate election (at which government would not be at stake) as a means of breaking the deadlock.

Fraser was also aware of these considerations. He knew that several Liberal senators were uneasy about the blocking of supply, and might not be relied on for much longer—as was indeed confirmed by Liberal Senator Reg Withers after the dismissal. He also saw evidence in the opinion polls that the public was unhappy about the action of the Senate in delaying supply. For this reason, he was keen to see the crisis brought to an early conclusion. Intervention by the Governor-General was the only clear remedy in the event that supply could not be legislated and the prime minister declined to advise an election.

Opposition backbenchers began calling on Kerr to dismiss Whitlam during October. On 16 October, the Liberal frontbencher, Robert Ellicott (a former Commonwealth Solicitor-General) published with Fraser's approval a legal opinion which he had prepared for the Shadow Cabinet, arguing that the Governor-General had both the right and the duty to dismiss the government if it could not obtain supply. On 17 October, Whitlam told an interviewer that the Governor-General could not intervene in the crisis in view of the convention that he must always act on the advice of his Prime Minister. Whitlam said later that he intended these remarks to protect Kerr, by making clear his view that the Governor-General had no power to intervene, but Kerr apparently saw them as an attempt to intimidate him, and also as expressing a view of the reserve powers that he did not share.

Kerr saw himself as an active player in the unfolding political drama. He made it clear in several conversations with ministers that he did not accept the view that the Governor-General could play no role in the crisis until supply actually ran out: he saw it as his duty to help prevent things from getting to that stage. On 30 October, he proposed a compromise solution to Whitlam and Fraser which would have, in effect, meant a backdown by Fraser (Kerr proposed that the Opposition allow the supply bills to be passed in return for Whitlam's abandoning plans to call an early Senate election), but Fraser did not agree to this. On 2 November, Fraser offered to pass the bills if Whitlam would agree to call an election before the middle of 1976, but Whitlam in turn rejected that solution. Under the Westminster convention upheld in Australia, it is the prime minister's prerogative to recommend the timing of an election. It became clear that Kerr had considerable discussions with Fraser, contrary to Whitlam's specific advice. When Whitlam rejected Fraser's proposal, it seems, Kerr decided that Whitlam was being intransigent.

Kerr's personal relationship with Whitlam by this stage was not strong, he had been upset by suggestions that the Executive Council had acted improperly during the Loans Affair and, moreover, he was suspicious that if Whitlam knew he was contemplating dismissing the Government, he (Whitlam) would react by pre-emptively advising the Queen to dismiss Kerr instead. Whitlam for his part assumed with characteristic confidence that Kerr would act predictably in the conventional manner of previous vice-regal appointees, was in full sympathy with the Government's position, and would do nothing to act against him. He therefore made no effort to obtain Kerr's agreement with his position and did not adequately consult with him during the crisis.