Initiatives and Referendums in The United States - Objections To The System

Objections To The System

The initiative and referendums process have critics. Some argue that initiatives and referendums undermine representative government by circumventing the elected representatives of the people and allowing the people to directly make policy: they fear excessive majoritarianism (tyranny of the majority) as a result, believing that minority groups may be harmed.

Other criticisms are that initiatives result in provisions being added to constitutions that would be better subjects for the more flexible statutory law, which can be more easily revised to fit changing circumstances, and that they clutter constitutions, which are supposed to be basic frameworks of government and not excessively detailed plans, with minutae, making them unwieldy. Many from both sides of the political spectrum further feel that lawmaking is best left to legislators, who presumably have a deeper interest in and more than a passing familiarity with issues and are best equipped to deal with them, a position which strikes "I & R" supporters as both anti-democratic and elitist. A further criticism is that an excessive number of propositions makes ballots too long and too incomprehensible to voters with only an average or less interest in the process and makes the entire voting procedure take too long, with very long lines forming as voters attempt to read initiative after carefully worded initiative. In response to this criticism, some jurisdictions place a limit on the number of initiatives which can be submitted to the voters at any one election. The metropolitan charter of Nashville, Tennessee, for example, limits the number of voter-sponsored initiatives which may be considered in any one election to two, a rather extreme example, but many other jurisdictions which have "I & R" as a part of their government have taken similar steps to limit it.

Other criticisms are that competing initiatives with conflicting provisions can create legal difficulties when both pass; and that when the initiatives are proposed before the end of the legislative session, the legislature can make statutory changes that weaken the case for passing the initiative. Yet another criticism is that as the number of required signatures has risen in tandem with populations, "initiatives have moved away from empowering the average citizen" and toward becoming a tool for well-heeled special interests to advance their agendas. John Diaz writes:

In some cases, voters have passed initiatives that were subsequently repealed or drastically changed by the legislature. For instance, legislation passed by the voters as an Arizonan medical cannabis initiative was subsequently gutted by the Arizona legislature. To prevent such occurrences, initiatives are sometimes used to amend the state constitution and thus prevent the legislature from changing it without sending a referendum to the voters; however, this produces the problems of inflexibility mentioned above. Accordingly, some states are seeking a middle route. For example, Colorado's Referendum O would require a two-thirds vote for the legislature to change statutes passed by the voters through initiatives, until five years after such passage. This would allow the legislature to easily make uncontroversial changes.

An objection not so much to the initiative concept, but to its present implementations, is that signature challenges are becoming a political tool, with state officials and opposing groups litigating the process, rather than simply taking the issue fight to voters. Signatures can be declared void based on technical omissions, and initiatives can be thrown out based on statistical samplings of signatures. Supporters lacking necessary funds to sustain legal battles can find their initiative taken off the ballot.