Operations Security (OPSEC)
See also: Operations_security- OPSEC as an IO Core Capability. OPSEC denies the adversary the information needed to correctly assess friendly capabilities and intentions. In particular, OPSEC complements MILDEC by denying an adversary information required to both assess a real plan and to disprove a deception plan. For those IO capabilities that exploit new opportunities and vulnerabilities, such as EW and CNO, OPSEC is essential to ensure friendly capabilities are not compromised. The process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and taking measures to mask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a defense-in-depth approach to securing friendly information. To be effective, other types of security must complement OPSEC. Examples of other types of security include physical security, IA programs, computer network defense (CND), and personnel programs that screen personnel and limit authorized access.
- What occurs, often, is that data is either leaked, stolen, or hacked online and the enemy has access to and can decipher what that information may say. This is especially true for defensive operational security. US servicemen and servicewomen may have facebook, multiple blogs, or upload photos, which can lead to the enemy knowing troop movements and locations. With this information, setting up ambush and wreaking havoc on US and support personnel becomes much easier. Geo-tagging features of cellular phones especially, may cause this type of breach in OPSEC.
In perhaps the most egregious failure in OPSEC to hit the US military in recent years, is Wikileaks.
- "WikiLeaks founder Julianne Assange's release of some 76,000 classified reports is clearly a breach of our national security, but underscores a growing problem in balancing information sharing with operations security (OPSEC) since the end of the Cold War. Consider that the U.S. has been involved with coalition operations over the past two decades including Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, and has endeavored to change the attitude of military forces from a "Cold War/OPSEC mindset" to one that encourages information and intelligence sharing. This attitude change emphasizes resisting the temptation to over classify information. While this is especially necessary in COIN operations, where intelligence is fleeting and requires quick action, recent events suggest that the Department of Defense may have gone too far."
Read more about this topic: Information Operations
Famous quotes containing the words operations and/or security:
“A sociosphere of contact, control, persuasion and dissuasion, of exhibitions of inhibitions in massive or homeopathic doses...: this is obscenity. All structures turned inside out and exhibited, all operations rendered visible. In America this goes all the way from the bewildering network of aerial telephone and electric wires ... to the concrete multiplication of all the bodily functions in the home, the litany of ingredients on the tiniest can of food, the exhibition of income or IQ.”
—Jean Baudrillard (b. 1929)
“Modern children were considerably less innocent than parents and the larger society supposed, and postmodern children are less competent than their parents and the society as a whole would like to believe. . . . The perception of childhood competence has shifted much of the responsibility for child protection and security from parents and society to children themselves.”
—David Elkind (20th century)