History of Guatemala - The Ten Years of Spring

The Ten Years of Spring

In 1944, General Jorge Ubico’s thirteen-year dictatorship (1931–44) of Guatemala was overthrown by the October Revolutionaries, a group of Guatemalan nationalists — politically dissident military officers, university students, and liberal professionals — who were politically empowered, by the almost-simultaneous revolutions that deposed superannuated dictatorships in Venezuela, Cuba, and El Salvador. The killing of a school teacher by a Guatemalan Army soldier culminated the civil unrest that precipitated the coup d’ état; the moral outrage of the Guatemalan national populace was manifested with a general strike that halted the national economy and stilled the country. In the event, the general strike deposed General Ubico, who surrendered power to a military junta of his generals — the triumvirate of Major General Bueneventura Piñeda, Major General Eduardo Villagrán Ariza, and General Federico Ponce Vaides, who then established a dictatorship. Nonetheless, despite the change in Guatemalan military government, further civil unrest prompted two officers, Captain Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán and Major Francisco Javier Arana, to lead a final coup d’ état and depose the dictatorship of the generals.

Nonetheless, the politically astute army officers then stepped aside from political office (the national presidency), and made way for a general election of the national government of Guatemala. That military respect for law began The Ten Years of Spring, a democratic period of free speech and open political activity, plans for national land reform, and the historical perception, by the intelligentsia, that much and great political progress could be made in realizing the civil governance of Guatemala. In 1945, the civilian president, Juan José Arévalo, was elected, and served until 1951. The Guatemalan President had been a university professor, who introduced social reforms, such as allowing the free establishment of political parties, and the restricted establishment of trade unions, which placated the socially dissatisfied public.

Arana and Arbenz, still both highly regarded at the time, anticipated to soon succeed Arévalo. Arana tried to prematurely hasten the process of Arévalo's descent in a failed coup which brought about Arana's death in a controversial arrest-gone-wrong. This cleared the way for Arbenz to secure power; as he did in a landslide general election in 1951. Arbenz together with Arévalo further promoted the progressive social change that characterized the latter's presidency, clearing much of the old restrictions on political parties and labour unions, while also purging the army brass of its remaining pro-Arana officers—one of whom was Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas; a man who would play a major role in Guatemalan politics in the coming years. Arbenz also permitted the Communist Guatemalan Party of Labour to achieve legal status in 1952. The party subsequently gained a noticeable role in the government decision-making process that it had not had before.

Ethnic Conflict “The quest for democracy had united them, but the definition of democracy would divide them.”

The first demonstration of ethnic conflict occurred on October 22, 1944, just two days after Ponce’s demise. Violence occurred at a small town called Patzicia, where about one thousand Indians rose in spontaneous outbursts: “in honor of our General Ponce,” and “we want land.” More than twenty ladinos were killed during this demonstration. When the Junta learned about this, it reacted swiftly. They dispatched soldiers and what happened next could only be described as a “bloodbath.” At least nine hundred Indians were killed and it did not matter whether they were women, children or men. The Chief of Staff of the Guatemalan army described his actions as an “act of warning throughout the Republic for any disorders of this nature.”

The conflict in the countryside from 1952-1954 between the Ladinos and Indians was not a new occurrence, but rather a continuation of a dilemma fueled by a complicated mix of class, regional, political, and ethnic differences since the colonial times. It originated from the exploitation of cheap Indian labour which was justified by a variety of derogatory myths concerning Indian capacity for change, work, and accepting civic responsibilities.

The small cases of ethnic conflict in rural Guatemala between 1944 and 1952 started an intense response among the Ladino elite for increased vigilance in rural areas, the denial of rights recently won through the revolution to Indians, and the frequent use of the military and violence to suppress the most minor sign of simmering unrest. This fear of ethnic conflict, of violent Indian uprising inspired by the relaxation of centuries of vigilance, helps explain Ladino reaction to the rather reasonable reforms of the revolution. It was this fear, among many other elements, that helped prompt the overthrow of the revolution in 1954.

This article in general is written from a perspective that fails to recognize the plights and contributions of the Guatemalan Indians. They were often displayed as members of communism however this was not the case. The book "I, Rigoberta Menchu" details the struggles of the Indians. After having land stolen they endured many years of further land theft, horrible torture and rape of their women. This was at the hands of the government. They worked for pennies and even those were stolen by landowners. They watched their children die of malnutrition and sickness in the fincas. They eventually rose up in an attempt to regain their rights; but their story is not told here. It is suggested that anyone with further knowledge on these matters contributes to the article.

Agrarian Reform and UFCo Conflict

In 1953 when the Agrarian Reform was put into practice, one of the largest U.S. companies, the United Fruit Company, had lost 250,000 out of 350,000 manzanas. According to the decree 900 this land had to be taken and redistributed for the agricultural purposes, mainly to the peasant communities and the natives. What remaining land UFCo held was thousands of acres in pastures as well as substantial forest reserves. The Guatemalan government had offered a Q 609,572 in compensation for the rest of the taken land.

The company fought the land expropriation and made a number of arguments. The first one attacked the wording of the Law. The Agrarian Reform Law focused on land development and agriculture, therefore anything in pasture, specified forest cover and cultivated land was to be left untouched by the expropriators. The company argued that most of the land that was taken from them was in fact cultivated and in use. So they claimed it was illegal to take it away. The second argument they had was against the amount of land taken and unsatisfactory compensation offered in comparison. The value of rural property was based on self-declared assessment for the tax purposes. Arevalo’s administration had called for new assessments in 1945, which had to be complete by 1948. UFCo had submitted the assessment by the due date; however when the Agrarian Reform was implemented the company declared that they want the value of its property changed. The government had investigated in 1951, but new assessment was never complete. UFCo used that to say that 1948 assessment was outdated and claimed its land value was a lot greater. They had estimated it as high as Q 15,854,849, which was almost twenty times more than what the Guatemalan government had offered.

As a result U.S. State Department and the embassy actively began to support of UFCo. The Guatemalan government had to fight the pressure because although U.S. had recognized, in words, that Guatemala had the right to conduct their own politics and business, U.S. representatives also claimed that they had to interfere because UFCo was their company that had brought in a lot of profit and harming the interests of that company was harming the U.S. economy. Arbenz did not have much choice except either to yield or to fight back. His administration explained that in order for Guatemala to improve its economy the Agrarian Reform was necessary, therefore Arbenz claimed he would adopt policies for a nationalist economic development if necessary. He argued that all foreign investment would be subject to Guatemalan laws. Arbenz was firm in promoting the Agrarian Reform and within a couple of years had acted quickly. He claimed that Guatemalan government was not prepared to make an exception for U.S. concerning decree 900.

Because Arbenz could not be pressured to take into consideration the arguments made to prevent expropriation from UFCo, his government was undermined with propaganda. For U.S. the national security was also highly important. They had combined both political and economic interests. The fear of allowing communist practices in Guatemala was shared by the urban elite and middle classes. All the papers, such as El Imparcial, were organized to critique communism and especially the government’s acceptance of it. The opposing political parties organized anticommunism campaigns. Thousands of people were present at the periodic rallies and the membership in anticommunist organizations had grown steadily. Another group that criticized the government was the church. Despite the warning that constitutionally the church was not allowed to interfere with the politics, the church paper Accion social cristiana published articles. One of them was against PGT, a faction Arbenz was attempting to support. The leader of the PGT Jose Fortuny was compared to the devil. The campaign against the communism was exaggerated. Arbenz’ government was attempting to be neutral; however constant pressure eventually had led him to rely more heavily on more dedicated reformers in revolutionary organizations.

In government, although Arbenz had attempted to appoint various representatives into cabinet, eventually the moderate representatives had were forces out of the leading positions. There had been a radicalization in major government parties. Those who thought that revolution was an effort to bring about electoral democracy and economic and social reforms either resigned or could not maintain their place in the parties. Some of these moderates who were forced out of the parties had complained that communists were taking over their positions. The propaganda was highly influential because even other Central America countries had concerns about the communism. The public opinion, the U.S. journalists and politicians, was leaning more towards the U.S. interference. By 1952 ‘Liberation army’, had invaded several towns in Oriente. Any attempt to appeal to the United Nation to stop the U.S. invasion had failed. By the June 1954 Arbenz had resigned.