Gyges of Lydia - The Mythical Gyges

The Mythical Gyges

Like many kings of early antiquity, including Midas of Phrygia and even the more historically documented Alexander III of Macedon ("the Great"), Gyges was subject to mythologizing. The motives for such stories are many; one possibility is that the myths embody religious beliefs or practices.

In the second book of Plato's philosophical work The Republic, Socrates encounters a man named Glaucon who uses a mythological story to prove a point about human nature. Ultimately, Glaucon and Socrates have very different interpretations of the same tale.

The story of Gyges's ring was a well-known myth before Plato used it in his book. It told of a man named Gyges who lived in Lydia, an area in modern Turkey. He was a shepherd for the king of that land. One day, there was an earthquake while Gyges was out in the fields, and he noticed that a new cave had opened up in a rock face. When he went in to see what was there, he noticed a gold ring on the finger of a former king who had been buried in the cave. He took the ring away with him and soon discovered that it allowed the wearer to become invisible. The next time he went to the palace to give the king a report about his sheep, he put the ring on, seduced the queen, killed the king, and took control of the palace.

Plato used the story as a metaphor for the corruption caused by power. In The Republic Glaucon recounts the story of the Ring of Gyges to Socrates. Glaucon argues that men are inherently unjust, and are only restrained from unjust behavior by the fetters of law and society. In Glaucon's view, unlimited power blurs the difference between just and unjust men. "Suppose there were two such magic rings," he tells Socrates, "and the just put on one of them and the unjust the other; no man can be imagined to be of such an iron nature that he would stand fast in justice. No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked out of the market or go into houses and lie with anyone at his pleasure, or kill or release from prison whom he would, and in all respects be like a god among men. Then the actions of the just would be as the actions of the unjust; they would both come at last to the same point."