Great White Fleet - Concerns and Preparations

Concerns and Preparations

Roosevelt's stated intent was to give the navy practice in navigation, communication, coal consumption and fleet maneuvering. Navy professionals maintained, however, that such matters could be served better in home waters. In light of what had happened to the Russian Baltic Fleet, they were concerned about sending its fleet on a long deployment, especially since part of the intent was to impress a modern, battle-tested navy that had not known defeat. The fleet was untested in making such a voyage and Tsushima had evidently proved that extended deployments had no place in practical strategy. The Japanese navy was close to coaling and repair facilities. While American ships could coal in the Philippines, docking facilities were far from optimal. An extended stop on the West Coast of the United States during the voyage for overhaul and refurbishment in dry dock would be a necessity. Planning for the voyage, however, showed a dearth of adequate facilities there, as well. The main sea channel of the Mare Island Navy Yard near San Francisco was too shallow for battleships, which left only the Puget Sound Navy Yard in Bremerton, Washington for refit and repair. The Hunter's Point civilian yard in San Francisco could accommodate capital ships but had been closed due to lack of use and was slated for demolition. President Roosevelt ordered that Hunter's Point be reopened, facilities be brought up to date and the fleet to report there.

There was also the question of adequate resources for coaling. This was not an issue when the Atlantic Fleet cruised the Atlantic or Caribbean, as fuel supplies were readily available. However, the United States did not enjoy a worldwide network of coaling stations like that of Great Britain, nor did it have an adequate supply of auxiliary vessels for resupply. This lack had forced Admiral George Dewey to buy a collier-load of British coal in Hong Kong before the Battle of Manila Bay to ensure his squadron would not be stranded at sea. The need had been even more pressing for the Russian Baltic Fleet during its long deployment, not just for the distance it was to sail but also because, as a belligerent nation in wartime, most neutral ports were closed to it due to international law. While the lack of support vessels was pointed out and a vigorous program of building such ships suggested by Rear Admiral George W. Melville, who had served as chief of the Bureau of Equipment, his words were not heeded adequately until World War II.

Federal regulations that restricted resupply vessels for Navy ships to those flying the United States flag, complicated by the lack of an adequate American merchant marine, proved another obstacle. Roosevelt offered initially to award Navy supply contracts to American skippers whose bids did exceed those of foreign captains by more than 50 percent. Many carriers declined this offer due they could not obtain enough cargo to cover the cost of the return trip. Two months before the fleet sailed, Roosevelt ordered the Navy Department to contract 38 ships to supply the fleet with the 125,000 pounds of coal it would nead to steam from Hampton Roads, Virginia to San Francisco. Only eight of these were American-registered; most of the other 30 were of British registry. This development was potentially awkward since part of the mission was to impress Japan with the impression of overwhelming American naval power. Britain had become military ally of Japan in 1905, which obligated it to aid Japan should a foreign power declare war against it. Technically, the list of potential combatants included the United States. The British government decided to play both sides of the political fence with the intent of moderating any Japanese-American friction that might arise.