Four Color Theorem - False Disproofs

False Disproofs

The four color theorem has been notorious for attracting a large number of false proofs and disproofs in its long history. At first, The New York Times refused as a matter of policy to report on the Appel–Haken proof, fearing that the proof would be shown false like the ones before it (Wilson 2002). Some alleged proofs, like Kempe's and Tait's mentioned above, stood under public scrutiny for over a decade before they were exposed. But many more, authored by amateurs, were never published at all.

Generally, the simplest, though invalid, counterexamples attempt to create one region which touches all other regions. This forces the remaining regions to be colored with only three colors. Because the four color theorem is true, this is always possible; however, because the person drawing the map is focused on the one large region, he fails to notice that the remaining regions can in fact be colored with three colors.

This trick can be generalized: there are many maps where if the colors of some regions are selected beforehand, it becomes impossible to color the remaining regions without exceeding four colors. A casual verifier of the counterexample may not think to change the colors of these regions, so that the counterexample will appear as though it is valid.

Perhaps one effect underlying this common misconception is the fact that the color restriction is not transitive: a region only has to be colored differently from regions it touches directly, not regions touching regions that it touches. If this were the restriction, planar graphs would require arbitrarily large numbers of colors.

Other false disproofs violate the assumptions of the theorem in unexpected ways, such as using a region that consists of multiple disconnected parts, or disallowing regions of the same color from touching at a point.

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