Double Play - Strategy

Strategy

Highly desirable to the pitching team and highly undesirable to the batting team, the double play often proves critical to wins and losses of specific games. The pitching team is likely to change pitch selection and defensive alignment to make one of the more common double plays (the ones involving infield ground balls) more likely. Batting teams may adapt themselves to thwart or even exploit the situation.

A so-called double-play position involves the second baseman and shortstop moving away from second base so that one of the fielders can field a ground ball and the other can run easily to second base to catch a ball thrown to him so that he can tag the base before the baserunner from first base can reach second base, the infielder tagging second base then throwing to first base to complete the double play. The pitcher tries to throw a pitch in the strike zone that, if hit, is likely to be grounded to an infielder (or the pitcher) and turned into a double play.

In a situation with runners on second and third and fewer than two outs, a team may decide to give an intentional pass to a hitter, often a slow baserunner who is perceived as one of the more dangerous hitters on the team or to the pitcher. A double play is then possible on a ground ball to a middle infielder. However:

(1) a subsequent walk scores a run, and

(2) the batter reaching first base on the intentional walk may score on subsequent plays should no outs be made.

This situation allows a great reward to the pitching team should it succeed in inducing a double play (far less opportunity of scoring) but also great reward to the batting team should it fail.

Batting teams can select lineups to reduce the likelihood of double plays by alternating slow right-handed hitters with left-handed hitters or hitters who are fast baserunners, or by putting a slow-running slugger (typically a catcher) in a low spot in the batting order (often #7 where there is no designated hitter). In a situation where a double play is possible, the batting team can

• attempt to steal second base if it is unoccupied (but only with a fast baserunner)
• sacrifice bunt, which concedes an out but advances the baserunner and prevents a double play
• either avoid swinging at pitches likely to become infield ground outs or foul them off
• avoid pulling the ball (a ground ball "pulled" by a right-handed batter to the left side of the infield is a likely double-play ball)
• hit and run, a play in which the baserunner on first runs to second immediately after the pitch is thrown in the hope that the batter makes contact with the pitch
• try to hit the ball as a long fly ball, ideally a home run

All of these strategies entail risk and may be either inappropriate or impossible, depending on the situation. A stolen base attempt ensures that the runner on first base is either at second (making a double play impossible) or out (likewise, but with an out and the loss of a baserunner). Some batters cannot bunt well, and poor bunts can themselves result in double plays. Avoiding the double-play pitch may mean taking a called strike. Trying not to pull the ball decreases the possibility of a home run that scores two or more runs. The hit-and-run play requires that the batter hit the ball, lest the baserunner be caught stealing on a throw from the catcher to the shortstop or second baseman covering second base and makes a pick-off of a baserunner more likely. A strikeout-prone hitter who swings wildly in the hope of getting a pitch that he can hit as a long fly ball as a sacrifice fly, double, triple, or home run is more likely to strike out.

Because the rarer double plays require baserunning errors, no team relies upon them to get out of a bad situation unless the opportunity arises. Even extreme strikeout pitchers such as Randy Johnson or Pedro Martínez sometimes have to rely on double plays to be effective.

The ability to "make the pivot" on an infield double play, i.e. receive a throw from the third-base side, then turn and throw the ball to first in time to force-out the batsman, while avoiding being "taken out" by the runner, is considered to be a key skill for a second baseman.

Cal Ripken, Jr. holds the major league record for most double plays grounded into in a career, with 350. He also holds the American League record for most double plays made by a shortstop. Both records are a consequence of his longevity as a player and the long grass at the Baltimore baseball stadium (Camden Yards and Memorial Stadium) as well as an accurate and strong throwing arm that allowed him to start more double plays than most other shortstops. As a batter, Ripken was a slow baserunner throughout his career, so he was less likely to reach base safely on a ground ball hit to the infield. A reasonably powerful right-handed hitter who frequently hit near the middle of the batting order and did not strike out at a high rate, he frequently came to the plate with runners on base, and usually made solid contact (as opposed to bunting) to usually put the ball in play. More likely to hit the ball sharply to the left side of the infield, placed in the order of the lineup so that he usually had runners on base ahead of him, and less likely to beat throws to first base, and having a very long career because he was a good hitter for average and power, this competent hitter grounded into an unusual number of double plays.

A batter who grounded into comparatively few double plays (72 in his long career) was Kirk Gibson, a left-handed hitter and a fast runner who struck out often but largely hit fly balls and hit few ground balls. As a left-handed hitter, if he pulled the ball and put it on the ground, he usually pulled the ball to the right side of the infield. To complete a double play on a ground ball that he did hit, a team had to complete the usually-difficult 3-6-3 or 3-6-1 double play; Gibson would usually reach first base before the double play could be completed in part because the 3-6-3 and 3-6-1 double plays take two long throws and in part because as a left-handed hitter he had a slightly-shorter run to first base. Like Ripken he was a power hitter usually batting in the middle of the batting order and often with runners on first base; unlike Ripken he hit far fewer balls toward fielders who could turn double plays upon him and struck out far more often, his strikeouts making a GIDP impossible.