Doolittle Raid - Impact

Impact

Compared with the future devastating Boeing B-29 Superfortress attacks against Japan, the Doolittle raid did little material damage, and all of that readily repaired. Eight primary and five secondary targets were struck. In Tokyo, the targets included an oil tank farm, a steel mill, and several power plants. In Yokosuka, at least one bomb from the B-25 piloted by Lt. Edgar E. McElroy struck the nearly completed IJN aircraft carrier Ryūhō, delaying her launch until November. Six schools and an army hospital were also hit. Japanese officials reported that the two aircraft whose crews were captured had struck their targets.

For years before Pearl Harbor, there had been mock air raid drills in every Japanese city, although China's air force was almost nonexistent. Such may have been part of the process of keeping warlike emotion at a high pitch. The Japanese press was told how to convey the news. The attack was depicted as a cruel, indiscriminate bombing targeted at civilians, women and children.

Despite the minimal damage inflicted, American morale soared when news of the raid was released. Still reeling from the attack on Pearl Harbor and Japan's subsequent territorial gains, the American public appreciated knowing that a successful military response had been undertaken.

The Japanese attempted to locate and pursue the American task force. The Second Fleet, its main striking force, was near Taiwan, returning from the Indian Ocean Raid to refit and replace its air losses. Spearheaded by five aircraft carriers and its best naval aircraft and aircrews, the Second Fleet was immediately ordered to intercept the anticipated raid, and then locate and destroy the U.S. carrier force, but was unable to accomplish either task.

The Imperial Japanese Navy also bore a special responsibility for allowing an American aircraft carrier force to approach the Japanese Home Islands in a manner similar to that of the IJN fleet to Hawaii in 1941, and likewise permit it to escape undamaged. The fact that rather large twin-engine land-based bombers carried out the attack served to confuse the IJN's high command about the source of the attack. This confusion and the conclusion that Japan itself was vulnerable to air attack strengthened Yamamoto's resolve to capture Midway Island, with the attempt to do so resulting in the decisive Japanese loss at the Battle of Midway.

"It was hoped that the damage done would be both material and psychological. Material damage was to be the destruction of specific targets with ensuing confusion and retardation of production. The psychological results, it was hoped, would be the recalling of combat equipment from other theaters for home defense thus effecting relief in those theaters, the development of a fear complex in Japan, improved relationships with our Allies, and a favorable reaction on the American people." —General James H. Doolittle, 9 July 1942