Common Purpose - Explanation

Explanation

In English law, the doctrine derives from R v Swindall and Osborne (1846) 2 Car. & K. 230 where two cart drivers engaged in a race. One of them ran down and killed a pedestrian. It was not known which one had driven the fatal cart, but since both were equally encouraging each other in the race, it was irrelevant which of them had actually struck the man so both were held jointly liable. Thus, the parties must share a common purpose and make it clear to each other by their actions that they are acting on their common intention so that each member of the group assumes responsibility for the actions of other members in that group. When this happens, all that flows from the execution of the plan will make them all liable. This is a question of causation in that oblique intention will be imputed for intermediate consequences that are a necessary precondition to achieving the ultimate purpose, and liability will follow where there are accidental and unforeseen departures from the plan so long as there is no novus actus interveniens to break the chain. In cases where there is violence beyond the level anticipated, the prosecution must prove:

(a) an act done by D which in fact assisted the later commission of the offence,
(b) that D did the act deliberately realising that it was capable of assisting the offence,
(c) that D at the time of doing the act contemplated the commission of the offence by A i.e. he foresaw it as a "real or substantial risk" or "real possibility," and
(d) that D when doing the act intended to assist A in what he was doing.

If there is doubt as to whether all the participants are contributing equally, those defendants whose contribution is less may be charged as accessories rather than as joint principals.

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