Camp David Accords - Criticism of The Accords

Criticism of The Accords

Because the agreements were concluded without participation of UN and PLO and the UN General Assembly found that they did not comply with the Palestinian right of return, of self-determination and to national independence and sovereignty, and also condoned continued Israeli occupation, the Framework for Peace in the Middle East was rejected. In Resolution 34/65 B of 12 December 1979, that agreement and all similar ones were declared invalid.

Although both sides generally abided by the agreements since 1978, in the following years a common belief emerged in Israel that the peace with Egypt is a "cold peace." Others feel that the Peace agreement was between the Israeli people and Egypt's charismatic President Anwar El Sadat, rather than with the Egyptian people, who were not given the opportunity to accept or reject the agreement with a free vote or a representative majority.

Like any delicate and highly charged agreement between bitter and seemingly implacable foes, there were unintended consequences. Although Egypt was rewarded annually with over $1 billion in U.S. aid, the psychological and financial health of the country suffered grievously. Not only was "Sadat's" peace almost universally despised in Egypt and the Middle East (indeed, Sadat's own prime minister resigned in protest), the country was expelled from the Arab League; every Arab country severed diplomatic ties with Egypt; commerce and trade between Egypt and its neighbors became anemic; there were massive bread riots; Muslim fundamentalists became more vocal and more popular than ever; and Sadat was forced to take the precaution of jailing nearly 1,300 opposition politicians. To make matters worse, Israel rubbed salt in the wound, further inflaming the Middle East, by annexing East Jerusalem, bombing Iraq's nuclear facilities, and building settlements in the West Bank. There were growing fears especially among Western, Egyptian, and Israeli intelligence agencies—that Egypt was on the brink of a Muslim fundamentalist revolution like the appalling one Iran had experienced two years earlier. (Iran's power elite was either summarily executed or had to flee the country, and 52 American diplomats were held hostage for 444 days. The ramifications of the Iran revolution continue to this day.) As a result of the Camp David Accords, Sadat—considered a pariah and traitor—was assassinated three years later on 6 October 1981, during a military parade, commemorating Egypt's "victory" over Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

To some, Sadat's assassination seemed too convenient. Because the peace was considered Sadat's personal peace—not Egypt's—and because the traitor had now paid with his life, Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's successor, was able to declare in a televised speech several hours after the assassination that "all treaties and charters" would be honored. Which meant that the Camp David Accords would not be repudiated. Furthermore, Egypt somehow managed not to fall into the hands of religious zealots. Eventually, Arab ambassadors returned to Cairo, and in 1989, Egypt was welcomed back into the Arab League.

Subsequently, there have been reports that Sadat's assassination was actually a conspiracy in which Hosni Mubarak was complicit. This allegation has been vigorously promoted by Sadat's daughter. Thirty years later, Mubarak was ousted from power during the "Arab Spring" and is now serving a life sentence for his role in the deaths of hundreds of Egyptian protesters. Egyptian prosecutors have also launched an investigation into his possible role into Sadat's murder. "The Search for the Lost Army," a recently published historical novel by Gary S. Chafetz, presents additional and somewhat compelling circumstantial evidence that Mubarak was indeed involved. For example, Chafetz points out that on 7 October 1981, a photograph appeared on the front page of The New York Times, reporting Sadat's assassination. The photo shows Hosni Mubarak to Sadat's immediate right and Defense Minister Abu Ghazala to Sadat's immediate left (taken by Sadat's official photographer, who was also killed in the attack), moments before Sadat was killed. Sadat, Mubarak, and Abu Ghazala are sitting shoulder to shoulder. About 40 people were killed and wounded in the attack, and yet neither Mubarak or Abu Ghazala was wounded. (Mubarak claimed to have injured his thumb and Abu Ghazala proffered a military cap with a bullet hole through it.) Author Chafetz alleges that Mubarak and Abu Ghazala must have had advance notice. In other words, the intelligence services knew of the plot and allowed the attack to take place. When the attack did begin, the reasons that neither Mubarak or Abu Ghazala were injured or killed was that they quickly threw themselves to the base of the five-foot red granite wall separating the front-row dignitaries from the parade of soldiers and military equipment. By an "amazing" coincidence, several supersonic Mirage jets happened to be flying overhead, distracting everyone in the reviewing stands and drowning out the machine gun fire, just as the four assassin soldiers launched their attack. Finally, Sadat's personal bodyguards did virtually nothing to stop the attack. This allowed one of the assassins to actually reach the granite wall, stand on tiptoes, and fire down onto Sadat's body with his machine gun.

Hours later, in a nationally televised eulogy for Sadat, Mubarak declared that "all charters and treaties"--including the Camp David Accords--would be honored.

As a result of Sadat's assassination, the Muslim Brotherhood remained banned and the Camp David Accords were saved, along with Egypt's power elite. Vice President Mubarak, now President, completed Sadat's term and went on to lead Egypt for the next thirty years. Furthermore, had the Muslim Brotherhood assumed power back in 1981, it would have repudiated the Camp David Accords at once. However, in 2012, that repudiation cannot be accomplished swiftly without grave geopolitical and economic repercussions to Egypt's fragile economy.