Battle of Verdun - German Strategy

German Strategy

After the German invasion of France had been halted at the First Battle of the Marne, in September 1914, the war of movement gave way to trench warfare with neither side being able to achieve a successful breakthrough.

In April 1915, all attempts to force a breakthrough by the Germans at Ypres, by the British at Neuve Chapelle and by the French at Battle of Champagne and Battle of Artois had failed, resulting only in very heavy casualties.

According to his memoirs written after the war, the German Chief of Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, believed that although a major breakthrough might no longer be achieved, the French army could still be defeated if it suffered a sufficient number of casualties. He justified his attacks on the French army as being in a position from which it could not retreat, for reasons of both strategy and national pride.

Verdun, surrounded by a ring of forts, was a stronghold and a salient that projected into the German lines and blocked an important railway line leading to Paris. However, by early 1916, its much-vaunted impregnability had been seriously weakened. General Joffre had concluded, from the easy fall of the Belgian fortresses at Liège and at Namur that this type of defensive system was obsolete and could no longer withstand shelling by German heavy siege guns. Consequently, pursuant to a Directive of the General Staff enacted on 5 August 1915, the Verdun sector was to be stripped of over 50 complete batteries and 128,000 rounds of artillery ammunition: a process that was still in progress at the end of January 1916. Moreover, the forts at Douaumont and Vaux had been designated for destruction, and demolition charges had already been placed when the German assault began on 24 February. Finally, the 18 large forts and other batteries surrounding Verdun were left with fewer than 300 guns and limited ammunition while their garrisons had been reduced to small maintenance crews.

In choosing Verdun, Falkenhayn had opted for a location where material circumstances favored a successful German offensive: Verdun was isolated on three sides and railway communications to the French rear were restricted. Conversely, a German controlled major rail head lay only 20 km (12 mi) to the north of their positions. In a war where materiel trumped élan, Falkenhayn expected a favorable loss exchange ratio, as he believed that the French would cling fanatically to what would become a death trap.

Falkenhayn claimed in his memoirs that, rather than a traditional military victory, Verdun was planned as a vehicle for destroying the French Army. Falkenhyan stated in his book that a memo he sent to the Kaiser stated:

"The string in France has reached breaking point. A mass breakthrough—which in any case is beyond our means—is unnecessary. Within our reach there are objectives for the retention of which the French General Staff would be compelled to throw in every man they have. If they do so the forces of France will bleed to death".

However, recent German scholarship by Holger Afflerbach and others has questioned the authenticity of this so-called "Christmas memorandum". No copy has ever surfaced and the only account of it appeared in Falkenhayn's post-war memoir. His army commanders at Verdun, including the German Crown Prince, denied any knowledge of a plan based on attrition. Afflerbach believes that it was likely that Falkenhayn did not specifically design the battle to bleed the French Army dry, but instead proposed ex-post-facto the motive for the Verdun offensive in order to justify its failure.

The offensive was probably planned to overwhelm Verdun's weakened defenses, thus striking a potentially fatal blow at the French Army. Verdun's peacetime rail communications had been cut off in 1915 and thus the city and its ring of forts were depending on a single narrow road (the future "Voie sacrée") and a local narrow-gauge railway (the "Chemin de fer Meusien") to be re-supplied. This logistical bottleneck had raised German hopes that the French could not sustain an effective defence of the Verdun sector beyond a few weeks.