Battle of Dunkirk - Halt Order

Halt Order

See also: Battle of Arras (1940) Quotes on Hitler's halt order During the following days... it became known that Hitler's decision was mainly influenced by Goering. To the dictator the rapid movement of the Army, whose risks and prospects of success he did not understand because of his lack of military schooling, became almost sinister. He was constantly oppressed by a feeling of anxiety that a reversal loomed... —Halder, in a letter of July 1957.

Major L.F. Ellis says:

The day's entry concludes with the remark: "The task of Army Group A can be considered to have been completed in the main" — a view which further explains Rundstedt's reluctance to employ his armoured divisions in the final clearing-up stage of this first phase of the campaign.

Halder wrote in his diary on 30 May:

"Brauchitsch is angry ... The pocket would have been closed at the coast if only our armour had not been held back. The bad weather has grounded the Luftwaffe and we must now stand and watch countless thousands of the enemy get away to England right under our noses."

On 24 May, Hitler had visited General von Rundstedt's headquarters at Charleville. Von Rundstedt advised him the infantry should attack the British forces at Arras, where the British had proved capable of significant action, while Kleist's armour held the line west and south of Dunkirk in order to pounce on the Allied forces retreating before Army Group B. This order allowed the Germans to consolidate their gains and prepare for a southward advance against the remaining French forces. The terrain around Dunkirk was considered unsuitable for armour, so the Allied forces' destruction was initially assigned to the Luftwaffe and the German infantry organised in Army Group B. Von Rundstedt later called this "one of the great turning points of the war."

The true reason for Hitler's decision to halt the German armour on 24 May is a matter of debate. One theory is that Von Rundstedt and Hitler agreed to conserve the armour for Fall Rot, an operation to the south. Another theory—which has recently been disputed—was that Hitler was still trying to establish diplomatic peace with Britain before Operation Barbarossa. Brian Bond stated:

Few historians now accept the view that Hitler's behaviour was influenced by the desire to let the British off lightly in hope that they would then accept a compromise peace. True, in his political testament dated 26 February 1945 Hitler lamented that Churchill was "quite unable to appreciate the sporting spirit" in which he had refrained from annihilating the BEF at Dunkirk, but this hardly squares with the contemporary record. Directive No. 13, issued by the Supreme Headquarters on 24 May called specifically for the annihilation of the French, English and Belgian forces in the pocket, while the Luftwaffe was ordered to prevent the escape of the English forces across the channel.

Whatever the reasons for Hitler's decision, he did not rescind it until the evening of 26 May. The three days thus gained gave a vital breathing space to the Royal Navy to arrange to evacuate the British and Allied troops. About 338,000 men were saved in about 11 days. About 215,000 were British, 123,000 were French – of whom 102,250 escaped in British ships.