Battle of Bannockburn - Preparations

Preparations

The English army marched rapidly to reach Stirling before Mowbray's agreement expired on 24 June. Edinburgh was reached on 19 June and by 22 June, it was at Falkirk, only 15 miles short of its objective. Edward's host followed the line of the old Roman road, which ran through an ancient forest known as the Tor Wood, over the Bannockburn and into the New Park, a hunting preserve enclosed at the time of Alexander III.

From the middle of May, Bruce's army had been assembling in the Tor Wood, an area providing good natural cover. On Saturday, 22 June, with his troops now organised into their respective commands, Bruce moved his army slightly to the north to the New Park, a more heavily wooded area, where his movements could be concealed and which, if the occasion demanded, could provide cover for a withdrawal.

Bruce's army, like William Wallace's before him, was chiefly composed of infantry armed with long spears. It was divided into three main (infantry) formations, a force of light cavalry, and the camp followers (who took part at the end of the battle).

Thomas Randolph, 1st Earl of Moray, commanded the vanguard, which was stationed about a mile to the south of Stirling, near the church of St. Ninian, while the king commanded the rearguard at the entrance to the New Park. His brother, Edward, led the third division. According to Barbour, there was a fourth nominally under the youthful Walter the Steward, but actually under the command of Sir James Douglas.

The army might have numbered as many as 9,000 men in all, but probably more of the order of 6,000–7,000. It was gathered from the whole of Scotland: knights and nobles, freemen and tenants, town dwellers and traders: men who could afford the arms and armour required. Barbour tells that King Robert turned away those who were not adequately equipped. For most, such equipment would consist of a spear, a helmet, a thick padded jacket down to the knees and armoured gloves. It is highly probable that a large proportion of the spearmen had acquired more extensive armour given that the country had been at war for nearly twenty years. This is in contrast to the modern romantic notion of the Scots army, which depicts its foot soldiers clad in kilts, painted woad and little else. The balance of the army consisted of archers and men-at-arms. The Scottish archers used yew-stave longbows and it is not to be thought that they had weaker or inferior bows but rather had inferior numbers. Consisting of possibly only 500 archers (although there is no documentary evidence as to their numbers), they played little part in the battle. There is first hand evidence from the captured Carmelite friar, Robert Baston in his poem, written just after the battle, that one or both sides employed slingers and crossbowmen. Each of these troop types was indistinguishable from their counterparts in France or England. Many of the Scottish men-at-arms (recruited from the nobility and the more prosperous burgesses) served on foot at Bannockburn.

Since his landing at Ayrshire in 1307, King Robert had demonstrated time and time again that he was willing to take risks, but these were always measured and calculated. He had no intention of chancing all on the outcome of a day, as had William Wallace at the Battle of Falkirk. Almost to the last minute, he was prepared to withdraw. The Chronicle of Lanercost seems to confirm that the English also believed he would seek to retreat as it states that " . . . the king’s advanced guard, commanded by Lord de Clifford, began to make a circuit of the wood to prevent the Scots escaping by flight". King Robert was persuaded to remain by news of the poor state of morale in the English army. But undoubtedly the most important factor in persuading him to make a stand was the ground before him.

The Bannockburn, over which the English army had to cross on the way to Stirling, and its sister streams flowed over the Carse of Stirling. A carse is an area which is wet in winter, but hard in summer, and most of it was used for growing wheat, oats, and barley. With the trees of the New Park covering Bruce's army to the west, the only approach apart from the Pows to the east was directly over the old road from Falkirk. If this route, virtually the only solid ground on which heavy cavalry could be effectively deployed, were to be denied to the English, they would have no choice but to wheel right to the north-east, on to the Carse.

To force Edward to take this route, Bruce adopted tactics similar to those he had used at the Battle of Loudon Hill: both sides of the road were peppered with small pits or 'pots', each three feet deep and covered with brush, which would force the enemy to bunch towards the centre of a dangerously constricted front. Once on the Carse, the English army would be caught in a kind of natural vise, as the main action on 24 June showed, with waterways to the north, east, and south. Such natural advantages were not easily obtained, and were unlikely to occur again.

There is some confusion over the exact site of the Battle of Bannockburn, although most modern historians agree that the traditional site, where a visitor centre and statue have been erected, is not the correct one. Although a large number of possible alternatives have been proposed, most can be dismissed and two serious contenders can be considered:

• the area of peaty ground known as the Dryfield outside the village of Balquhiderock, about three-quarters of a mile to the east of the traditional site, and
• the Carse of Balquhiderock, about a mile and a half north-east of the traditional site, accepted by the National Trust as the most likely candidate.