Battle of Adwa - Background

Background

As the 20th century approached, most of 19th-century Africa had been carved up among the various European powers. The two independent exceptions were the tiny Republic of Liberia on the west coast of the continent and the ancient Ethiopian Empire in the strategic Horn of Africa. The Kingdom of Italy was a relative newcomer to the colonial scramble for Africa. Italy had only two recently-obtained African territories, both located near Ethiopia on the Horn of Africa: Eritrea and Somali-land. Both were impoverished. Italy sought to improve its position in Africa by conquering Ethiopia, which would join its two territories.

In 1889, the Italians signed the Treaty of Wuchale with Emperor Menelik II. The Italian language version of the disputed article 17 of the treaty stated that the Emperor of Ethiopia consented (i.e. was required) to Italy representing Ethiopia in its relations with all foreign sovereigns and states, which made the Ethiopian Empire a protectorate of the Kingdom of Italy. The Amharic version of the article stated that the Emperor of Ethiopia could use the good offices of the Kingdom of Italy in his relations with foreign sovereigns and states if he wished (optional). As a result, Italy and Ethiopia faced off in what was later to be known as the First Italo-Ethiopian War.

In late 1895, after advancing deep into Ethiopian territory, a small Italian-led unit was defeated by a much larger Ethiopian group at the Battle of Amba Alagi. The Italians were forced to withdraw to more defensible positions in Tigray, where the two main armies faced each other.

By late February 1896, supplies on both sides were running low. General Oreste Baratieri, commander of the Italian forces, knew the Ethiopian forces had been living off the land, and once the supplies of the local peasants were exhausted, Emperor Menelik's army would begin to melt away. However, the Italian government insisted that General Baratieri act. On the evening of 29 February, Baratieri met with his brigadiers Matteo Albertone, Giuseppe Arimondi, Vittorio Dabormida, and Giuseppe Ellena, concerning their next steps. He opened the meeting on a negative note, revealing to his brigadiers that provisions would be exhausted in less than five days, and suggested retreating, perhaps as far back as Asmara. His subordinates argued forcefully for an attack, insisting that to retreat at this point would only worsen the poor morale. Dabormida exclaiming, "Italy would prefer the loss of two or three thousand men to a dishonorable retreat." Baratieri delayed making a decision for a few more hours, claiming that he needed to wait for some last-minute intelligence, but in the end announced that the attack would start the next morning at 9:00. His troops began their march to their starting positions shortly after midnight.