Balancing (international Relations) - Balancing Failure & Criticisms

Balancing Failure & Criticisms

Both internal and external forms of balancing encounter a fair share of obstacles, problems and criticisms. Internal balancing is subjected to a number of domestic obstacles that can impede its success. High costs associated with it and the difficult task of allocating resources to be able to make significant contributions to ones economic and military development are among the main ones. Furthermore, independently balancing a major power would require major expansion of ones capabilities and accelerated rearmament, which would undoubtedly provoke unfavourable responses from not just the major power in question but also other states. A state that adopts a strategy of military build up to increase its security and balance a rising power may inadvertently do the very opposite and create unfavourable conditions for all in the international system. It can inevitably causes a security dilemma, whereby the increase in power and security of one state decreases that of another and offsets offensive actions, potential arms races and escalating hostility among actors, hindering collective security.

External balancing, even though it is a more commonly practiced form of balancing, encounters a variety of obstacles and criticisms. Its success is contingent on an enduring and coherent alliance system, however given the structural constraints of the international system, this might be difficult to attain and ensure. The anarchic nature of the international system together with the states’ primary goal of survival intrinsically causes a self-help approach from all states, whereby reliance and trust on other actors are significantly undermined. Alliances do however form despite these structural impediments, however they are seen as temporary arrangements that should not be overly relied upon. The international system is subjected to the enduring conditions of insecurity and uncertainty about the intentions and actions of actors within it which makes cooperation difficult to achieve and maintain. Furthermore, external balancing is caught in the problematique of the 'game of coordination' and a collective action problem in which it is difficult to sustain long term cooperation, dedications and equal contributions to the cause. There are powerful incentives to free-ride on the efforts of others and in this way avoid costs and risks while enjoying the alliance benefits. Since individual actors in the alliance have the same interest and goal in mind - to balance the major, rising power - it should logically follow that everyone in that alliance will act on behalf of the common interest and objective. However, even though there is an expectation to share the costs and efforts of achieving a common goal, alliances and groups demonstrate a tendency towards exploitation and inconsistent dedication and input among participants. Mancur Olson, one of the leading theorists on collective action identified that despite all the members sharing a common interest, groups (or alliances for this purpose) lack a common interest in paying the costs of achieving a collective benefit, making it problematic to achieve the ends and difficult to maintain the alliance.

However, the main critique surrounding balance of power theory and subsequently balancing behaviour of states highlights that this logic applies to and concerns the period of the rise of hegemon – that is to say that states will come together and balance a rising power which has potential or demonstrates ambitions towards becoming a hegemon, while saying very little and making no predictions about the occurrences once hegemony is already established. As such, this theory and predicament of state behaviour falls short of explaining occurrences on today’s world frontier. At present, the U.S. enjoys a well established primacy, with power and capabilities greatly superior than that of other states. At no other period in history was the margin of dominance of one state over others so extensive, making the traditional application of balance of power theory and predictions of balancing behaviour from secondary powers inapplicable.